

PROCESSES AND APPROACHES THAT AFRICA SHOULD ADOPT FOR
A MORE RESPONSIVE AND EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT AND
RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS ON THE
CONTINENT

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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
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
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ABSTRACT

PROCESSES AND APPROACHES THAT AFRICA SHOULD ADOPT FOR A MORE RESPONSIVE AND EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS ON THE CONTINENT by MAJ Francis Vib-Sanziri, Ghana, 106 pages.

This thesis examines the processes and approaches that Africa (regional and sub regional bodies alike) should adopt to be able to manage conflict situations before they get blown out, or resolve them when they have escalated. The time when African countries and organizations remained dormant and awaited the United Nations and super power nations to intervene to solve her problems is over, and Africa will have to take the initiative in this direction.

This realization compelled the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to set up a mechanism for conflict resolution within its organizational structure. In view of this initiative by the OAU, this study looked at two separate conflict situations in Africa that the regional organization (OAU) and a sub regional organization (ECOWAS) put in efforts to resolve the conflicts. These situations were in Chad and Liberia.

The study examines the two situations to identify the causes of the conflicts and areas where these organizations were found wanting in their peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in line with the basic tenets of mediation, negotiations, and peace support operations. The study goes further to suggest ways that Africa could prepare to tackle such situations in future more responsively without losing credibility, either in the eyes of the adversaries or the international community.

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My thesis is not intended to be a cookbook to resolving conflicts in Africa, but to unearth some of the fundamentals of approaching conflict situations pragmatically. My information or facts have been drawn from published sources and I owe a debt of gratitude to scholars whose published works made it possible for me to start my analysis.

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Combining the normal academic curriculum in the U.S Army Command and General Staff College with this Masters Program is not a project that most students would want to undertake because of the workload involved. When I started the project, I was skeptical if I could go through successfully. However, the cooperative and brotherly attitude of the members of my thesis committee encouraged and revamped my interest to get through. Lieutenant Colonel Karl Prinslow, my committee chairman and the African Analyst in the Foreign Military Studies Office of the college made available to me a lot of material relating to African conflict situations, and readily gave me guidance any time I approached him. Lieutenant Colonel Daze, an instructor in the Combined Arms and Staff Services School (CAS3), and a committee member was very instrumental in the approach I adopted for the analysis in the thesis. He often referred me to books and at times provided me with some of them to read to see how I could tackle the project. Dr Graham H Turbiville, Jr, the Director of Foreign Military Studies Office, and the second member of my thesis committee equally provided me with material on the subject and gave me intellectual directions on how to write such papers. In all, my committee members critically read

through my drafts and provided objective and constructive criticisms which made my reviews and corrections a bit easier. I really owe them much for their splendid cooperation and concern.

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Last but not the least, the Almighty God who gave me the peace of mind and comfort in such difficult times must be praised for his blessings.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
CDR	Conseil Democratique Revolutionnaire
CSM	Conseil Superieure Militaire
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
FAN	Forces Armees du Nord (Northern Armed Forces)
FAP	Forces Armees Populaire
FLT	Front de Liberation du Tchad
FROLINAT	Front for the Liberation of Chad
GUNT	Government of National Unity in Chad
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority for Development (East Africa)
INN	International Negotiation Network (President Jimmy Carter's NGO)
INPFL	Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
JCMC	Joint Cease-fire Monitoring Committee
LDF	Lofa Defense Force
LPC	Liberian Redemption Council
MPLT	Movement Populaire de Liberation du Tchad
NDPL	National Democratic Party of Liberia
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia

NRC	Nimba Redemption Council
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PNA	Parti Nationale African
PPT	Parti Progressiste Tchadian
PRC	People Redemption Council
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RPF	Rwanda Patriotic Front
SADC	South African Development Community
SATU	Special Anti-Terrorist Unit
SMC	Standing Mediation Committee
SRSG	Special Representative of Secretary General
UDT	Union Democratique du Tchad
ULIMO	United Liberation Movement of Liberia
ULIMO K	United Liberation Movement of Liberia-Krahn
ULIMO M	United Liberation Movement of Liberia-Mandingo
UN	United Nations
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNOMIL	United Nation Observer Mission in Liberia
UNT	Union National Tchadiane

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This thesis analyzes what processes and approaches “Africa” should adopt for a more responsive and effective management and resolution of conflicts on the continent. Africa in this context will be represented by the regional and sub regional bodies, such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), the South Africa Development Conference (SADC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in East Africa (IGAD). It will also represent initiatives taken by indigenous African non-governmental organizations, such as the All African Council of Churches and other eminent African personalities in the direction of conflict resolution.

Conflict management and conflict resolution are two different concepts. According to Mohammed Rabie, a research fellow on conflicts, “Conflict management is a process to bring conflict under control, while conflict resolution is a process to end conflict.”¹ Conflict management is a step towards resolving conflict by making it controllable, but it does not necessarily lead to ending the conflict. Conflict resolution as a peace process is a comprehensive approach to ending conflict and nearly eliminating its causes.

Throughout the period of the cold war, 30 million people have died in more than eighty wars and conflicts.² The competitive interest of the then superpowers served to contain and suppress nationalist and inter ethnic violence. However, the demise of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 brought an end to superpower competition and the cold war conflict. The removal of regional superpower interests and ideological pressures allowed new conflicts to emerge, and were often characterized by the fragmentation of sovereign states. Of these wars and conflicts in the world, over sixteen countries in Africa are involved with very devastating repercussions.

In the Liberian civil war, about 200,000 refugees are currently living in La Cote D'Ivoire, 350,000 in Guinea and about 15,000 in Ghana. One of the largest exodus in the history of mankind was recorded by the ethnic conflict in Rwanda which sent nearly one million men, women, and children into the vast and uncertain plains and forests of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) and Tanzania. The University of Maryland Minorities at Risk project revealed that, of the world figure of 21 million refugees, over 7 million are in Africa and that, of a total of 25 million internally displaced people in the world, 15 million are in Africa.

Under Article 53 of the UN charter, regional arrangements have been envisaged for addressing regional conflicts as a means of decentralizing the UN effort at conflict management and resolution. The tendency now is for governments and regional organizations in various areas of conflicts to be much more concerned with such conflicts. If one looks at the conflict in Bosnia, initially, most of the countries that deployed for peacekeeping were Europeans. In Cambodia, the Asian countries participated actively. It remains a pity for the African continent that Rwanda was engulfed in a genocide in 1994, and Africa could not assist.

That is not to say Africa has never attempted resolving conflicts on her own. Indigenous African organizations have sponsored two peacekeeping operations: they are the OAU with its Pan African force in Chad in 1982 and the ECOWAS sponsored monitoring group (ECOMOG) operations in Liberia from 1990. These attempts call for the OAU and other subregional organizations in Africa to start thinking of organizing and applying their resources towards their own conflict management and resolution. It was therefore no surprise that at the 28th Annual Summit of OAU in Dakar in June 1992, African heads of state adopted, in principle, the establishment of a mechanism for preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts in Africa. The Secretary General of OAU was tasked to develop a plan for making such a mechanism operational. Following discussions and a review at the Council of Ministers meeting in Addis Ababa in February 1993 and the Cairo summit in the summer of 1993, the heads of state formally

endorsed the mechanism. It is in the light of these developments that there is the need to look at what processes and approaches that Africa should adopt in managing and resolving her conflicts more responsively and effectively.

To be able to consider and analyze the processes and approaches to effective management and resolution of conflicts, this thesis will address the causes of these conflicts. A cardinal assumption has been that efforts to ameliorate ethnic conflicts must be preceded by an understanding of the sources and pattern of that conflict.³ A conceptual understanding of the reasons behind conflicts is important to conflict management and resolution because it helps policymakers identify root causes and suggest formulas for mediators to use to reduce disputes. Conflicts or disputes cannot be eliminated entirely because they are an integral part of life and a basic component of every society. Conflict is in fact part of human life, and peace a dream. As noted by Morton Deutsch, “Conflict can neither be eliminated nor even suppressed for long. Conflict is the root of personal and social change. The social and scientific issue is not how to eliminate or prevent conflict, but rather how to live lively controversy instead of deadly quarrels.”⁴ The thesis will also take a look at contemporary conflict situations in Africa and analyze the role played by Africa in either managing or resolving them. The situations in Chad and Liberia will be examined for the purpose of identifying the shortcomings of some of the conflict resolution attempts by Africa.

Importance

The plight of African countries already laboring under the burden of extreme poverty, excessive debt obligations, an ever-widening gap between the rich and the poor, and a slump in commodity prices and their adverse effects on development seems to have worsened with more of these conflict situations. These conditions, it must be admitted, provide a fertile ground for breeding more conflicts and undermine the achievement of peace and security. While dramatic changes are taking place in the international scene and among the major powers, Africa continues

to suffer from a multitude of violent conflicts. The toll of these conflicts is monumental in terms of war damage to productivity, the quality of scarce resources diverted to armaments and military organizations, and the resulting insecurity, displacement, and destruction in affected states. Africa, in response to internal demands as well as international changes, has begun to focus her attention and energies on these problems, and is trying innovative ways to resolve these differences by nonviolent means.

In global terms, Africa has become increasingly marginalized and has been pushed into the background of the world system. The end of the Cold War has diverted western investment and aid to Eastern Europe. In September 1993 when the President of the United States stated at the UN General Assembly that “the UN must know when to say no to her involvement in conflicts,”⁵ he was not announcing a new policy. It was a policy begun in early 1992 by the Bush administration. After the Cambodia peacekeeping operations in 1991 and the price tag of US \$2 billion declared, the US and other significant financial contributors to the UN requested the Security Council to be more selective in its approach to conflicts. The stand of the US and other major contributors reflected the slow and lukewarm attitude of the UN Security Council towards the internal conflicts in Somalia, Burundi, and Rwanda after that declaration.

According to a political analyst, Herman J Cohen, “the US took an aggressive posture in Angola where it had interest, allowing the security council to take a bold step in pledging as many as 7,000 UN troops to support a renewed peace agreement between the government and UNITA, and in Somalia a US-led military effort stopped the starvation in late 1992.”⁶ The new atmosphere of selectivity and caution in the UN Security Council makes it imperative to look to regional solutions for regional problems.

Other aspects that make this topic relevant are the changes in the international politics and the role of regional organizations. Under Article 53 of the UN charter, regional arrangements are envisaged for addressing conflicts as a means of decentralizing UN efforts. This point was

forcefully expressed by the former Secretary-General Dr Boutros Boutros Ghali in the “Agenda for Peace,” when he stated that “peace in the largest sense cannot be accomplished by the UN system alone.” He continued that, “Now is the time for its nations and people and the men and women who serve it, to seize the moment for the sake of the future.”⁷ It was in the light of these developments that the OAU established a central mechanism for conflict prevention, management, and resolution in 1993. It is therefore necessary to see how these organs and other African initiatives can be made effective.

Nature of Conflicts in Africa

Since the 1960s, Africa has been wrecked by deadly conflicts more than other regions of the world. Understanding the form or nature of these conflicts will give a clearer view of how the causes come about. Conflicts in Africa by nature cut across political, economic, and socio-cultural barriers. Broadly, these conflicts are categorized into interstate and intrastate conflicts.

Interstate conflicts are conflicts between nations, particularly those that share common borders. Examples of such conflicts include the Nigeria-Cameroun border dispute, the Libya-Chad conflict over the Aouzou strip, the 21- year- old dispute between Morocco and the Algerian-backed Polisario Front over Western Sahara, and the claims by Somalia over the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and parts of Kenya. These conflicts have always raised tensions but have not been explosive.

Intrastate conflicts on the other hand are conflicts within the borders of a country and are a more predominant and explosive form in Africa. These conflicts usually involve mobilization of people based on several overlapping identities: ethnicity and class, class and political association, and ethnicity and political association, or sometimes a combination of all. Political association is often the key element: demonstrations by workers, riots by ethnic minorities, and secessionist movements typically follow from mobilization by leaders who make selective political appeals to

communal and class groups and use the organizational tactics of modern political movements.⁸

These conflicts can be distinguished in various forms.

There are the elite conflicts which are a common form of strife. Elite of different backgrounds, favoring diverging policy positions, and pursuing different interest, have always contended with each other to promote their separate concerns and to protest against measures perceived as detrimental to their well being. Elite conflicts, though small in scale and limited in scope, involve the actual or potential power strata in African states. In countries where governmental performance has been unimpressive, elite conflicts have sometimes assumed more active expression in the form of petitions, demonstrations and even strikes to press for their claims. Purges, state terror, and genocide are generally policies used by new elite when they get to power to consolidate their rule and eliminate the possibility of future challenges.⁹ Since the elite is influential in these societies, conflicts engineered by them tend to involve a greater portion of the population.

Another form of the intrastate conflict is factional conflicts. These conflicts, though spearheaded by the elite, reaches out to a variety of social groups and down to the local level. Mobilization for factional conflicts takes place through conscious appeals on the basis of ethnicity and class and goes beyond the confines of the urban areas. They breed on local conflicts over land, chieftaincy and religion and strike deep into the countryside. The Komkomba-Nanumba-Gagomba ethnic conflict in Ghana in 1994, for example, was over the issue of paramountcy among the chiefs. Other examples of factional disputes in Africa include the Tuaregs in Mali and Niger, the Cassamance in Senegal, the Kwazululand on South Africa, and the Muslim fundamentalists in Algeria. It is difficult to contain factionalism without modifications in societal values.

The most common and devastating of intrastate conflicts is the communal/ethnic- based ones. Communal conflicts seek to forward the political expression of subnational identities by

seeking adequate representation of minority rights. They pose a serious threat to the structure of authority or the integrity of the state. Examples of such conflicts include the Katanga secession in the Congo from 1960-1963 and the Biafran secessionist attempt in Nigeria which eventually led to the civil war in that country from 1967-1970. Other current examples of communal/ethnic conflicts include Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Liberia, Zaire, and Angola. The organization of communal conflicts is based on careful preparations: mobilization of political support, accumulation of resources (finances and weapons) which is normally with foreign support. Conflicts that are primarily based on communal identifications are usually directed at other communal groups in the form of riotous clashes or in extreme cases, civil wars, leading to mass slaughter such as those perpetrated by the Tutsis against the Hutus in Burundi in 1988 and the Hutu genocide against the Tutsi tribe in Rwanda in 1994. Such communal identities take “modern” terms, for example, demanding more equitable treatment for a communal group or revolutionary or secessionist movement. Most of these conflicts lead to formation of rebel armies made up of former army officers and enlisted men of the national armies and sometimes foreign military rebels. These are a form of revolutionary conflicts which pose a threat to the validity of state power. Such conflicts usually rely on the emergence of a leader, usually military, who would give voice to their sentiments and act upon them.¹⁰

All these forms of conflicts in Africa pass through a series of progressive stages as tension builds up. The conflict cycle described by Akuamoah Boateng, a senior lecturer of the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration, include the latent, perceived, felt, manifest, and aftermath stages.¹¹ The latent stage is when conditions conducive to conflict exist but have not yet been recognized. At the perceived stage, the cause or causes of a conflict would have been recognized by one or both parties to the conflict. When tension begins to build up but short of actual fighting among parties or adversaries, it is termed the felt stage. At the manifest level, disagreements are evident as fighting breaks out, and third parties become aware of the

conflict situation and efforts made to resolve it. The last stage of the cycle is the conflict aftermath. This is when the conflict is ended by a resolution or any form of suppression, and peace prevails or disagreements may still continue, but underground.

All conflict situations in Africa therefore fall under one of these forms and stages. Subsequent chapters will highlight the stages at which attempts were made to resolve some of these previous conflicts, and whether that was appropriate.

Assumptions

The thesis will be based on a number of assumptions. First, it is assumed that the strategic importance of African countries will continue to be peripheral to the foreign policy priorities of the developed countries, and therefore the UN will equally continue to marginalize African problems. This assertion is based on the fact that the developed countries are the financiers of the UN and also maintain the veto. The US government, for example, announced its position on this issue with President Clinton's address to the UN General Assembly in 1993. A number of cases can be cited to support this marginalization of Africa. The Liberian civil war of 1989 is a case in point. Liberia has been an American ally from time immemorial, and the situation there since its inception never attracted the full attention of the US until the problem was out of control and ECOWAS had to be drawn in. The US was very active in places like Panama, Grenada, the Middle East and Bosnia, but had to pull out of Somalia when eighteen US Army Rangers were killed. Another example is Rwanda in 1994. During the peak of the Rwandan crisis (April-July) most of the non-African countries withdrew their contingents leaving only a small Ghanaian force of about 250 all ranks. Even Belgium, which once colonized Rwanda, pulled out her force because of the killing of eleven of its troops.

Second, the thesis also assumes that more conflict situations in Africa could erupt. Apart from the potential conflict situations which have not yet erupted, the existing ones in Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, Liberia, Zaire, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Angola which are dormant could

intensify anytime again. A peace arrangement has been achieved in Liberia after seven years of negotiations through a democratic election, and one of the faction leaders Mr. Charles Taylor was elected on 2 August 1997 as the country's new president. Considering the history of the factions in Liberia, no one can have total faith in their commitment to this arrangement. Factional fighting also erupted in Somalia in June 1997 again and has once more died down. Mr. Laurent Kabil, a rebel leader in Zaire who started a rebellion against the then president Mr. Mobutu Sese Seko in November 1996, managed to overthrow Mobutu's government in May 1997 and is currently holding a shaky country. The Rwanda and Burundi Hutu-Tutsi conflicts are not situations that one can say are settled. Rwanda in particular, where the majority Hutu tribe is virtually in exile with the whole of the former government army and its war machinery, evokes the high expectation that this exiled army could come back to fight another day. The implication of these assumptions is, that when these conflict situations erupt the burden of managing or resolving them will definitely fall on Africa first.

Definitions of Key Terms

As stated earlier conflict management and conflict resolution are two different concepts. The two terms, however, are associated with reducing the effects of conflicts on society. In this thesis therefore, the two will be used to mean one and the same thing. Defining the elements which constitute conflict resolution will assist in the understanding of the analysis of the thesis. Elements of conflict resolution identified are preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-building, and peace enforcement. These terms have been defined by many writers in various ways. However, most of these definitions come to mean the same thing. The definitions in this thesis will be based on those given in the UN Agenda for Peace.

Preventive Diplomacy. Preventive Diplomacy is defined as action to prevent dispute from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.

The most important elements of effective preventive diplomacy are measures to build confidence and trust; early warning based on information gathering and formal fact finding.

Peacemaking. Peacemaking consists in action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in the UN charter.

These means in the UN Charter include mediations and negotiations undertaken by an individual or group of persons mandated by the UN Security Council, the General Assembly or the Secretary General. In the African scene, the mandate could be given by the OAU or the sub-regional group undertaking the mission.

Peacekeeping. This is defined as the deployment of a force presence in the field with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving military and/or police personnel and frequently civilian also. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.

It must be emphasized that besides the consent of the parties to the conflict, there are other basic assumptions underlying peacekeeping operations. These include: (1) continuing and stronger support of the operation by the mandated Authority, (2) clear and practicable mandate, (3) non use of force except as a last resort, (4) willingness of member states to provide personnel, and (5) willingness of member states to make available the necessary financial and logistic support.

Peace Enforcement. This is the application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions. Its purpose will normally be to maintain or restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long term political settlement. The United States actions in Somalia in 1992 and 1993 are examples of peace enforcement actions.

Peace Building. Post-conflict peace building is action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a recurrence of conflict and

advance a sense of confidence and well-being among the people. These may include disarming the previous combatants and restoring order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections and advancing efforts to protect human rights.

Limitations

To answer the primary research question, the thesis will concentrate on conflict situations in Africa that some amount of African attempts have been made either independently or with assistance from countries or organizations outside Africa to resolve. The conflict situations to be examined were in Chad and Liberia. The shortcomings in these attempts by Africa to resolve these conflicts will be the main focus of this analysis. However, answers to secondary questions in the thesis may take the analysis beyond the specified countries to include some conflicts of post independent Africa.

¹Rabie Mohammed, Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1988), 50.

²British Army, Field Manuel, Wider Peacekeeping (London: Army Publication-Forth Draft, 1994), 1-7.

³Donald L Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflicts (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), 564.

⁴Morton Deutsch, Theoretical Perspective of Conflict Resolution (New York: New York Press, 1990), 38.

⁵Herman J. Cohen, African Capabilities for Managing Conflicts: The Role of the United States, in African Conflict Resolution: The US Role in Peacemaking, by David R. Smock and Chester A. Crocker (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 77.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Boutrous Boutrous Ghali, Agenda for Peace (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1992), 48.

⁸Francis M Deng and William I Zartman, Conflict Resolution in Africa (Washington DC : R R Donnelley and Sons Co., 1991), 168.

⁹Noami Chazan, Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1992), 171.

¹⁰Ibid., 204.

¹¹Akuamoah Boateng, "Conflict Resolution-Role of Civic Education," in Report on Proceedings-Seminar on Non-Governmental Organizations as Agents for Civic Education (Accra: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 1994), 26.

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND METHODOLOGY

The subject of conflict, conflict management and conflict resolution has assumed an important dimension in the social, political, economic, and military spheres because of the adverse effects conflicts have had on the whole globe in general and the affected areas in particular. A number of academics and research fellows have written several books, papers and journals and reports on various aspects of the subject. Several seminars on the subject have also been held and some of these presentations compiled into good reference materials for a better understanding of past and contemporary conflict situations. The subject is also addressed in numerous case studies. The analysis in this research will rely on some of these materials and experiences, particularly the case studies on Chad, Liberia, and Rwanda conflicts.

Sam C. Nolutshungu, a Political Science Professor of University of Rochester, in his book Limits of Anarchy-Intervention and State Formation in Chad looks at the long experience of civil strife and foreign intervention in Chad, and illustrates some of the fundamental difficulties involved in the attempt to achieve political stability through armed intervention. He traces the military intervention of France and Libya, the multilateral mediation efforts, and the deployment of a peacekeeping force by the OAU with the hope of facilitating a democratic resolution to the conflict. He also touched on the impact that superpower interests, particularly the United States, had on the Chadian conflict resolution. This literature provides a detailed historical development of the situation in Chad during the civil strife. Though he identified some fundamental difficulties in the African peace process in Chad, his analysis was not based on the basic principles of mediation, negotiation, and peacekeeping but on international political maneuvers.

M. Weller, a research fellow of the Cambridge University Research Centre, in his book Regional Peacekeeping and International Enforcement: The Liberian Crisis looks at the military

intervention in the Liberian civil war by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which he claimed, marked a significant departure in regional peacekeeping. The book reproduces significant documents, including statements from the parties to the conflict and official documents emanating from ECOWAS detailing the peacekeeping effort. It also analyzes some legal issues concerning the operation which he termed controversial. The book basically covers the background to the conflict, the ECOWAS initiative, subsequent peace accords and their implications and the United Nations/ECOWAS joint action towards peace in Liberia.

“Peacekeeping and the challenges of Civil Conflict Resolution” edited by Canadian Professor David A. Charters, is a collection of case studies on the subject of peacekeeping. In Chapter 7, the topic: “Peacekeeping by Regional Organizations: The OAU and ECOWAS Peacekeeping Forces in Comparative Perspective,” presented by Amadu Sesay, looks at the regional and subregional attempts at conflict resolution. In what he termed the “Try Africa First” approach to conflict resolution on the African continent, he concentrated his study on the Chadian and Liberian conflicts of 1979-1982 and 1990, respectively. He tried to determine the extent to which these operations were “truly” peacekeeping operations and their successes in executing their mandates. His discussions are centered on the genesis of the forces, their mandates, their legal status/legitimacy and administrative/logistic matters. This comparative study gives a detailed account of these peace processes and opens them to an analysis of whether they were in tune with the tenets of conflicts resolution and principles of peacekeeping.

The United Nations and Rwanda-1993-96, is a UN Official Publication on the peace efforts in Rwanda with the introduction written by the then Secretary General, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali. It gives an authoritative and broad overview of the background of the conflict and traced the efforts towards peace. The role played by the OAU in the peace negotiation leading to the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement has been extensively highlighted in the

write up. Additionally, it looked at the implementation of the agreement and the subsequent difficulties leading eventually to the chaotic situation that engulfed Rwanda from 6 April 1994. The problems of OAU and the UN in their efforts at peace at various stages of the process have been highlighted.

In his book "Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity," Mohammed Rabie outlined a systematic approach to negotiation and mediation in conflict resolution which he termed the "Integrated Model of Mediation and Negotiation." He defined a peace process as a political framework for conflict resolution intended to conceive and facilitate the implementation of the solution to end hostilities and change the status quo and create new environments more conducive to cooperation.¹ The bottom line of his definition is that any attempt at resolving a conflict should embody an idea of where things ought to be, or what the desired outcome of the process is to look like. To achieve this, the model advocates that a peace process should go through three fundamental phases: the initiation of the process, the negotiation to conceive and conclude agreements and the implementation of the agreements.

Initiation Phase. The model sees the initiation phase, or what he called the political dialogues phase, of any peace process as very vital for the success of subsequent phases. This phase enables adversaries to communicate to each other, through a mediator in order to explain their differences. It also gives the mediator(s) the chance to explain the objective and structure of the peace process, and discuss frameworks to govern the subsequent phases.

Negotiation Phase. The model expects that agreements will be conceived and concluded for the settlement of the conflict. It is expected that adversaries during this phase will concentrate on substantive matters that caused the conflict. Mohammed Rabie believes that during this phase sacrifices in demands may have to be made by adversaries and risks taken to reach a mutually acceptable agreement that provide for building new and cooperative relationships.

Implementation Phase. Attention, according to the model, is focused during this phase on creating conditions to end hostilities, and build new relationships among adversaries more conducive to peaceful co-existence and long term cooperation.

The model is based on the belief that no meaningful peace process can be initiated and sustained without the adversaries acceptance of certain principles to govern the negotiators, channel deliberations towards the desired endstate, and maintain the process on track.

Mohammed Rabie also identified a number of approaches which differed in their operational goals and means to ending conflicts and establishing peace. They include: the control approach, step by step approach, comprehensive approach, integrative approach, democratic approach and the shared homeland approach.

The Controlled Approach. This approach relies on military power to destroy the power base of the adversary to secure domination and prevent any other options of political compromise. At best this approach may succeed in stopping violence temporarily but not establishing peace.

The Step by Step Approach. This method seeks practical and realistic arrangements to contain the conflict and to eliminate the causes of the conflict. Negotiation is therefore the main tool of this approach, which should continue to de-escalate the process until final settlement is attained.

The Comprehensive Approach. It seeks comprehensive settlement to conflicts on the basis of compromise. The approach tries to convince parties to the conflict that compromise in demands in the agreement is a precondition to ending conflict. It advocates that each adversary accepts less than it had desired and a little more for his opponent. This approach he claimed is more likely to end conflicts that are interest-related, but not suitable for value-related ones which are usually non-negotiable.

The Integrative Approach. This approach tries to integrate the interest of the various parties to the conflict into the solution package without any party sacrificing his values. The approach relies on innovation and is founded on the necessity of building mutually beneficial relationships to tie adversaries together.

The Democratic Approach. This has been advocated for resolving conflicts that are centered on political power. According to the tenets of this approach, people are given the opportunity to choose their leaders through democratic elections. Advocates of this approach claim democracies are less likely to resort to use of force to resolve conflict.

The Shared Homeland Approach. The separation of interest-related issues from value-related ones that cause conflict is the concern of this approach. It seeks to separate the value-related political and cultural rights of conflicting parties while integrating their economic and security interests across political lines. This approach, according to Rabie, is most suitable when dealing with conflicts and resolving problems related to minority rights.

The United States Army Field Manual 100-23, on Peace Operations outlined some principles of peace operation as a guide to planners and executors of these types of operations. They include: clearly defined and obtainable objectives, unity of effort, security, restraint and legitimacy as explained below.

Clearly defined objective. As in all military operations, peace operations require an objective with a precise understanding of what constitutes success. Commanders must understand the strategic aims, set appropriate objectives, and ensure these aims and objectives contribute to unity of effort with other agencies. These broad objectives will normally be set out in the mandate for the operation by a competent authorizing entity.

Unity of Effort. The components of peace support operations are always many and varied and the successful execution of the operation depends on the effective coordination of all

these agencies. An atmosphere of cooperation is therefore necessary to achieve unity of effort.

The appointment of an individual or agency to execute the policies of an agreement results in more effective control of an operation.

Security. Security in the area of operation is necessary to prevent any hostile factions to acquire any unexpected advantage. Security goes beyond physical protective measures, to perceived legitimacy and impartiality, the mutual respect build between the force and the other parties involved in the operation, and the forces credibility.

Restraint. In peace support operations, the military playing an impartial third party role must apply appropriate military capabilities prudently. Restraint on weaponry, tactics and level of violence characterize the environment of peace operations. These restraints are spelled out in the rules of engagement (ROE) by the authorizing agency.

Legitimacy. The perceived impartiality of peacekeepers and the sponsoring agency is critical to the success and legitimacy of the operations. Legitimacy is derived from the mandate authorizing and directing the conduct of operations. The mandate alone does not confer legitimacy to a force. It is necessary to have the consent of the parties to the conflict.

Impartiality, deriving from, and in turn, sustaining consent, has the interest and most significant application in peace operation. As in a game of rugby, the referee is outnumbered thirty to one, and he stands no chance of exerting his will by force. What enables him to control the players is the perceived legitimacy of his status. A key ingredient of that legitimacy is his impartiality. The concept of impartiality thus emerges as a major determinant of the conduct of peacekeeping operations. To guide against being partial, the force must adhere to the consent principles of impartiality, legitimacy, credibility, mutual respect, minimum force, and transparency as a third party.

This literature review provides the paper a basis on which the analysis of the case studies to be considered will be centered on. The processes postulated by Mohammed Rabie is not necessarily a fault proof method of peacemaking; neither are they definite, that once followed, peace must be achieved. They are however an integrative and systematic approach to sensitive issues such as conflict resolution. It is a process that has been applied by the postulators in the US-Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) dialogue in 1988 to get the Israelis and Palestinians to sit together to try to resolve their differences. The process was successful, in that, it got the US and PLO to start a dialogue on the "Israeli-Palestinian Problem," which eventually resulted in the "Land for Peace" agreement. This has led to an independent State of Palestine, even though there are still other procedural problems yet to be tackled.

The principles of peace support operations on the other hand are principles that have been tried in various peacekeeping operations by the United Nations, and have proven to be fundamental in any attempts to really keep a peace process going. Peacekeeping successfully contributed to the management and control of a number of conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli conflicts and those between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.² Peacekeeping, the innovative conflict resolution tool of the Cold War period, however proved to be inadequate in tackling many Post-Cold War conflicts, prompting calls for a change in the role of the military in the peace process. This has led to the development of concepts like "wider peacekeeping," "second generation peacekeeping," and "peace support operations."³

The research will look at the developments that led to each of the conflicts in Chad and Liberia, and subsequently trace the unfolding of the peace processes from the mediation and negotiation stages (peacemaking) up to the insertion or deployment of the military (the peace support operations). The role played by Africa (OAU or the Sub regional Bodies) in the

peacemaking and peace support operations will be closely examined in accordance with the Mediation and Negotiation Model and the Principles of Peace Operations outlined in the review.

On the peacemaking efforts, attention will be focused on the quality of mediation. That is, were mediators knowledgeable in the conflict situations and the parties they were dealing with? Did they have credibility in the face of the adversaries they were dealing with? Were mediators committed to really seeking an acceptable solution and were they representative of the parties? Also a look will be taken at the negotiation processes to ascertain if agreements were well conceived with defined approaches and attainable objectives. The role of mediation in such cases become one of building consensus through innovation, persuasion and protection of antagonist basic interests. Credible mediation that works to build consensus is more likely to cause perceptions to be transformed on both sides of a conflict.⁴ Agreements that result from the negotiation should address the underlying causes of the conflicts, be acceptable and viewed as satisfactory by all conflicting parties and be reached jointly without undue pressure or intimidation.⁵

With regard to Peace Support Operations, emphasis will be placed on the principles stated earlier and the mandates given to the missions. Other contributing factors to successful peace operations such as the composition of the forces, command and control and the logistic component of the forces will also be examined.

The overall picture of the common problems associated with each of these case studies will be the main focus of the analysis to this study. This will eventually lead to providing answers to the main thesis question of "what processes and approaches should Africa adopt for a more responsive and effective resolution of conflicts on the continent."

¹Mohammed Rabie, Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1988), 68.

²See United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1990), 15.

³See British Army-Field Manual, Wider Peacekeeping, 1-2. Wider Peacekeeping goes beyond the traditional peacekeeping of having interpositional and observer missions to demobilization, humanitarian relief, and denial of movement operations. United Nations Publication, United Nations Peacekeeping (New York: UN Public Information, 1993), 8. Second generation peacekeeping is characterized by conflicts within nations rather than between nations leading to civil wars and ethnic conflicts. The complicated military tasks in second generation peacekeeping are complimented by measures to strengthen institutions, encourage political participation, protect human rights, organize elections, promote economic and social developments, humanitarian assistance, enforce embargoes and reform the Military and Police forces. US Army, FM 100-23, Peace Operation, (Washington DC: Department of Army Publication, 1994), iv. Peace Support Operations is a new and comprehensive term that covers a wide range of activities. These operations create and sustain the conditions necessary for peace to flourish. They comprise support to democracy (peacemaking, peace building, preventive diplomacy), peacekeeping, and peace enforcement.

⁴Rabie, 137.

⁵Ibid, 140.

CHAPTER THREE

CASE STUDY--CHAD CONFLICT, 1979-82

Background to the Conflict

Chad like most other African countries, went through a period of colonization under the French. Before that, the political communities, empires, and stateless societies that existed in Chad related to each other without any of them extending its authority over the others. They were, however, linked by trade. French rule had imposed a kind of unity simply by placing the whole area under a single ultimate authority, and by reorienting the trade of the region to foreign markets, it removed that important link between the northern and the southern parts of the country. It effectively created two political identities – North and South.¹ The differences in pre-colonial political structures of Chad, the varied economic roles assigned to them, and the colonialists pre-conceptions and theories about the difficult human types who inhabited the North and South, led to different administrative practices in the two areas. The French had more respect for the pre-colonial social distinctions and authority systems (traditional chiefs) of the Islamic North, and therefore granted an “indirect rule” system through the chiefs. In the south, on the other hand, the political and social identities were ignored and a colonial “direct” system of the chiefship which was alien was imposed. The Islamic North resisted all forms of assimilation as resolutely as it shunned educational and religious absorption into the French system, while the south accepted the French values of education, as well as Catholic and Protestant religions.

As competitive politics started emerging in Chad, it was in response to development in France. The Union Democratique du Tchad (UDT), a local offshoot of De Gaulle's Rassemblement du Peuple Francais, was formed in Chad, comprising the traditional authorities of the Islamic North, to oppose the Parti Progressiste Tchadian (PPT), a radical nationalist movement which was gaining popularity in the south. The northern chiefs aligned themselves

with the colonial authorities to defend their status against a new African Stratum, an emergent elite that was avowedly hostile to traditional rulers. Although competitive representative politics created the sense of an emergent national states, it also encouraged dangerously decisive forms of political consciousness. Issa Hassan Khayar described the colonial perceptions which each of the groups had at the time:

To the Muslim political elite, the colonial authorities counseled distrust of their former slaves of the south. In addition, particular emphasis was placed upon the Arab and Muslim character of the northern populations, in opposition to those of the south considered inferior biologically and socially, and changed with having no history and no civilization. By contrast, in the economic domain and in regard to education, the southern region was valued. It became the “useful Chad,” “Christian Chad” . . . in opposition to the “Chad of the Cows,” [a reference to animal husbandry in the north as against crop production in the south], “Chad of the Sultans,” or the “Chad of the Muslim invaders of the peaceful Christians of the South.”²

During this period, it became difficult in the North to distinguish between the defense of Islam and the defense of their class interest. The North-South divide did not mean that there was total unity of all northern elite or southern elite. In the North, there was a new aspirant elite that also emerged to oppose the Northern traditional political chiefs. In the South, there were divisions; and within the PPT, political orientation and personal ambitions created differences. The North-South divide or Regionalism was a strategy for the defense of privilege and position, or, for each party, an attempt to exclude rivals, rather than a faithful expression of the anxieties and aspirations of ordinary people. The Polarization of the North and South was also a model for further subregional rivalries, manifested in the proliferation of small parties. Unstable political alliances, based on personal political ambitions, produced a climate of deep suspicion and intrigue in elite politics. Before independence elite politics in Chad, was a contest over the colonial succession, dominated by civil servants and state employees who were conditioned in their thinking by the character of the colonial state.

Causes of the Conflict

On attaining independence on 11 August 1960, Chad came under a Prime Ministerial system of parliamentary government under Francois Tombalbaye, of PPT of the South. His government was immediately characterized by dictatorship and tribalism. His immediate plan was to secure complete control of the party and the state. He first tried to eliminate rivals within his party, followed by the opposition in parliament and descended on the Northern elite in all sectors of the political class. Barely two weeks, on assuming office, he dismissed President Lisette, who was on government business in Israel. In the municipal elections during 1961, the government disqualified the candidates of the Parti National African (PNA) - a coalition of Northern parties, that had agreed to form a union with PPT.³ In May 1963, the government claimed it had uncovered a plot involving three ministers of Union Nationale Tchadiene (UNT), and the President of the assembly, all Muslims, and definitely from the North. His focus was principally on the intelligentsia, politicians and bureaucrats, who he suspected could be in a position to replace him. His ambition to survive these speculated threats from opponents led to a dependence on his kinsmen of Madjingaye Sara to fill all key security posts.

To further assert his unchallenged position, he formally interdicted all opposition parties in 1962 and made himself Executive President. The imposition of one party rule and the alienation of the North and Muslims led to the formation in 1966 of the Front for the National Liberation of Chad (FROLINAT) in Sudan by exiled Chadians, predominantly originating from the Center-East area of Mangalme in Northern Chad. The Center-East area of Mengalme in October 1965 had revolted against the government for high taxes and other political issues resulting in several hundreds of casualties and many going into exile.

Before the FROLINAT rebellion took hold, the Chadian state was in disarray. Few people regarded the state as a source of moral authority. It was a known fact that the government

was corrupt, cruel, arbitrary and absurd. FROLINAT accordingly gained ground rapidly, benefiting from the widespread discontent. Other opposition sections, notably the Front de Liberation du Tchad (FLT), a guerrilla organization formed by exiled Chadians also shot up in Sudan.

FROLINAT resorted to armed national liberation because civil politics was blocked. Within two years of its formation, the guerrillas scored chaotic victories on the battlefield in the Center-East. Chadian forces who were inadequately trained and equipped, lacking popular support and definitely with low morale, were unequal to the challenge of the rebels. The French government intervened militarily in Chad for the first time in 1968, to save the post colonial state and to secure administrative reforms that would minimize the chances of successful revolts in future.⁴ This intervention prolonged Tombalbaye's tenure of office until his overthrow on 13 April 1974 by the military, and a new government- the Conseil Supérieure Militaire (CSM) formed by General Felix Malloum.

The overthrow of Tombalbaye did not still bring unity in the country. Foreign intervention in the politics of Chad continued to put impediments in their way of coming together. FROLINAT, the original Liberation Movement was breaking apart because of issues involving France and Libya and the Aozou strip. Hissene Habre and Goukouni differed in FROLINAT over Libya, leading to the break-up of the front and the formation of Forces Armee du Nord (FAN) by Habre with a section of the second Army of FROLINAT. Habre in an interview at the time stated that:

From the time I arrived in Tibesti at the end of 1971 to the beginning of 1972, I began to wonder. From this time, in fact, the Libyans began distributing Libyan identity cards to the inhabitants of Tibesti and Aozou, predating them. They invited the traditional chiefs to Libya and corrupted them. On the ground their agents explained that Libyans and Chadians were one and the same people who were only divided by colonialism. At the same time they prepared the minds by distributing food and clothing to the population. When they had enough clients, they came to install themselves in the locality of Aozou and then the whole region. Twice we called a meeting of the leaders of

the region for a decision to make the Libyans go. The discussions were very hard on each occasion, difficult, but we were never able to obtain a majority. It was after the second meeting in 1976 that I broke off from Goukouni's group and left Tibesti.⁵

For some other reasons, there were further break away groups from FROLINAT, and by in August 1980, there were as many as eleven factions seeking inclusions into the government during one of the peace negotiations. The most prominent ones include: the Movement Populaire de Liberation du Tchad - MPLT, led by Aboubakar Abderahmane; Forces Armee Popularie (FAP), led by Goukouni, Forces Armee du Nord (FAN) led by Habre; Conseil Democratique Revolutionnaire (CDR) led by Ahmat Aycl; the First Army (Volcan) led by Adoum Dana and the Conseil Superieure Militaire of Felix Malloum. Hissene Habre rallying to FROLINAT from the beginning was viewed with suspicion as he was described as "a puppet rebel planted by the French secret services to torpedo the Chadian National Liberation Front."⁶

Chad, after independence had at least twenty different ethnic groups and languages. Its history from this period suffered factional fighting because of struggle for power by the elite. The failure of Francois Tombalbaye to integrate the northern tribes into his government at independence caused the taking up of arms by the north in an armed guerrilla movement - FROLINAT against his government, and his inability to contain the activities of FROLINAT contributed greatly to his overthrow by the military. General Felix Malloum, the military leader was equally unsuccessful in bringing the Liberation movement under control which facilitated the ascendancy of the rebel forces. Internal fighting and power struggle within FROLINAT led to the break up and subsequent struggle for the control for the capital - N'Djamena.

It was Libya's actions that eventually compelled a swift response from the OAU, as the Libyan leader, Colonel Qaddafi, sought to install a pro-Libyan regime in Chad as a prelude to the formal annexation of the northern border area of Chad (Aozou strip).⁷ The growing involvement of Libya in Chad was of concern to the OAU and the international community, including United

States and France, and was more threatening when Libya announced an agreement of achieving full unity of Chad and Libya. This eventually led to a Nigerian initiative to reconcile the factions through political dialogue.

Mediation and Negotiations

The first African attempt at negotiating a settlement among the Chadian factions was in 1976 by Sudan. At this time Libya had grown more meddlesome in the affairs of Chad. It was very instrumental in the breaking up of FROLINAT by getting rid of non pro-Libyan elements in the movement. It was during this period that Hissene Habre broke away from Goukouni to form his FAN. Concern about Libyan aims provoked Sudan (as well as France) to initiate negotiations between Habre and General Malloum to counter balance any deal that might be reached with FROLINAT leader Goukouni, under Qaddafi influence.⁸ This initiative led to a power-sharing government between the CSM and Habre's FAN. It did not have any chances of a long run success, considering the objectives for which it was initiated. It was an unholy alliance since the architects did not consider the interest of each of the factions. The question of Libya was the common factor that brought these factions into a union, ignoring other reasons that had from the beginning distanced Habre from the southern politicians. The pact that was signed sought to share power between the President (General Malloum) and the Prime Minister (Habre) in every aspect of governance, making it impossible for either to take an initiative without the formal concurrence of the other. The Habre-Malloum Pact was anything but a meeting of minds, they had their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another . . . which is a posture of war.⁹ It was therefore not surprising that the seizure of the passports of three of Habre's ministers at the airport when they were on their way out of the country on government business, could have led to a civil war between the factions in March 1979, after only eight months of power sharing. Sudan's effort at stemming peace in Chad landed on rocks and perished.

The civil war that ranged became bloodier and pitiless. The war was not confined to armed clashes between FAN and CSM forces but assumed communal aspect from the start, with violence against and among civilians.¹⁰ The war and the growing involvement of Libya in the conflict, motivated Nigeria to take the initiative and subsequently involved other African countries and the OAU to reconcile the factions for a peaceful settlement of their differences.

Nigeria called for the first reconciliation conference which she offered to host from 10-14 March, 1979 in Kano, dubbed Kano I. Kano I was aimed at reconciling the factions in the civil war and setting up a Provisional Governing Council, pending the constitution of a transitional government of national unity at a subsequent meeting which would include other factions. The factions that participated in this conference were Habre's FAN, CSM of General Malloum, Goukouni's wing of FROLINAT (i.e., Forces Armee Populaire-FAP) and the Third Army (MPLT). Habre and Malloum agreed to withdraw from the government to be formed, and Goukouni was therefore made the President of the Provisional Coalition Governing Council with two representatives each from the participating factions.

Kano I to some extent was successful. It was able to get some factions to a round table conference which led to a cease fire and the setting up of a neutral governing body. However, this conference was not broad based, in that, it involved only the factions that favored the French presence in Chad at the time. France did not participate but sent observers. Nigeria, the sole mediator/negotiator, without the consent of the factions dispatched a peacekeeping force of 800 troops to N'Djamena (the capital) apparently to ensure observance of the cease fire. The sending of troops by Nigeria particularly without the consent of the factions raised a lot of skepticism.

Kano II which was schedule for 3-11 April 1979, found five additional factions then participating. Cameroon, Libya, Niger, and Sudan sent representatives as observers to this conference. This conference was to work out a constitution for the transitional government of

national unity. At this stage, Habre and Goukouni factions had gone into alliance again and strongly objected to Libya and Nigeria participating in the conference as negotiators because they were alleged to have armed some of the factions, and therefore not impartial. Habre' faction raised the alarm about what they saw as Nigerian collusion with Libya, accusing both of dictatorial interference in Chads affairs.¹¹ Habre and Goukouni also objected to any power sharing with the other factions suspected of having links with Libya and Nigeria. Little was achieved during Kano II because Nigeria's creditability was questioned, and this led to the Governing Coalition in Chad, apparently with French support to proclaim the N'Djamena Accord which established the Government of National Unity without waiting for the next conference under Nigeria initiative. Goukouni and Habre were interior and defense ministers respectively, with Lol Mohamat Choua of the Third Army as President and General Negue Djogo of CSM as Vice President. Nigeria's unilateral peacekeeping force was compelled to withdraw. At this point in time, the South which was ignored in all these negotiations had formed the Permanent Committee to regulate the affairs of the South, and was at war with the North again.

The peacemaking effort had derailed at this stage and Nigeria had to impose an oil embargo on Chad to compel the factions to return to the negotiation table. The government of Chad could not be moved by the economic sanctions of Nigeria and refused to attend the next conference which was called in Lagos in May 1979 - Lagos I. Nigeria was however, commended by OAU for her efforts at the OAU summit in Liberia at the time and encouraged to call another conference, now with more African states participation and OAU support. This led to the Lagos II conference in August 1979, and as many as eleven factions attended: all seeking inclusion into the Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT). This conference was broad based. All factions in the conflict participated on equal footing and there were not less than ten African states represented as neutral observers. The Lagos II Accord provided for the creation of a

Government of National Unity, representing all the factions participating in the conference, to prepare for an eventual transfer of power to a freely and fairly elected government. It also called for a cease fire between all factions and demilitarization of the capital. A neutral force from countries not bordering Chad was proposed to remain in Chad until an integrated army was formed. It also requested an independent Control Commission directed by the OAU Secretary General to be established to operate under the "moral authority" of GUNT.

With the signing of Lagos II Accord, the GUNT was eventually formed on 10 November 1979, with Goukouri as the President, Kamougue of CSM as the Vice President and Habre holding the defense ministry. It was this accord that formally requested an African Peacekeeping force to operate in Chad to see to the implementation of the Lagos Accord. However, the African force could not be deployed before war broke out again between Goukouri forces (GUNT) and Habre's, barely five months after the forming of GUNT. The armed interventions of Libya in favor of GUNT led to Habre's defeat and exile and the unification of Chad and Libya in January 1981. It was probably this unification that urged the United States and France to support an African initiative, not because of the Lagos Accord but rather to prevent Libyan influence in Chad.

The OAU Peacekeeping Effort

The first attempt to keep the peace in Chad during the period of conflict was in March 1979. This was a unilateral attempt by Nigeria, which was the sole mediator between the CSM and FAN factions, when the first civil war broke out. Nigeria decided to send a force of eight-hundred troops to N'Djamena after the Nigerian Deputy Head of State had visited Chad to start the necessary arrangements for a reconciliation conference between the factions in Nigeria (Kano). What the Nigerian troops were actually supposed to do is not clear; apparently they were vaguely intended to ensure observance of the cease-fire and to permit free movement on the main

thoroughfares of the city.¹² The decision to send a force to N'Djamena was taken before the first reconciliation conference (Kano I) was held on 10 March 1979. It was therefore no surprise that Nigeria's initiatives were viewed with skepticism. Goukouni and Habre who had by this time again formed a coalition vehemently accused Nigeria of being dictatorial and partial in her mediation attempts and called for the withdrawal of her peacekeeping force. The forces of Goukouni (FAP) and Habre (FAN) came very close to a clash with the Nigerian force. Nigeria's attempt to unilaterally deploy troops in Chad failed, leading to a shift of the burden of mediation from Nigeria to the OAU, which minimized the misunderstanding between the Chadian factions and Nigeria.

Lagos II under the auspices of the OAU installed a GUNT and called for a neutral force composed of troops from countries not bordering Chad to deploy in the country until an integrated army was formed. Though the GUNT was formed with Goukouni and Habre as President and Defense Minister respectively, the neutral OAU force could not be raised as stipulated in the Lagos II agreement. With the inception of GUNT, it was still clear from the disagreements between the coalition (Goukouni and Habre) over the influence of Libya in Chad, that the government was not capable of surviving. The fragile peace soon collapsed with the outbreak of civil war again between Goukouni and Habre forces in N'Djamena in March 1980. Goukouni as the President, invited Libya to unilaterally assist him in the battle in N'Djamena, which Libya readily accepted and in November 1980, Libya troops entered the fray.

It was Libya's actions that eventually compelled a swift response from the OAU, as the Libyan leader, sought to install a pro-Libyan regime in Chad as a prelude to the formal annexation of the northern border area of Aozou strip. This raised concern among OAU member countries, the United States and France, especially in January 1981 when an agreement on achieving full unity of Chad and Libya was announced. This compelled a meeting of OAU

Heads of States in Nairobi in June 1981, which agreed to send a peacekeeping force to Chad, and Goukouni persuaded to call for the withdrawal of Libyan forces. A 3,000 force drawn from Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire deployed after the withdrawal of Libyan forces, principally to undertake the task of manning of observation posts, check points, road blocks, 24 hour patrols, preventing armed elements from entering the area of operation and cordon and searches.¹³ The force mandate was therefore to ensure the defense and security of that country while awaiting the integration of its government forces.¹⁴ With the exception of Nigeria, Senegal was proposed and financed by France and United States financed Zaire to participate in the mission. The OAU force failed to diffuse the crisis; neither was it able to secure its area of operation as mandated. By June 1982, despite the policing of N'Djamena by this force, Habre forces captured the city with Goukouni fleeing into Libya. Immediately the Nigerian and Senegalese troops withdrew leaving the Zairian troops behind for several months to give protection to Habre's regime.¹⁵ The OAU force had failed woefully in its peacekeeping attempt in Chad.¹⁶ A chronology of the major events in this peace process is at Appendix A.

Rabie's Model and the Peacemaking Effort

The outbreak of fighting in N'Djamena in 1979 between General Malloum (CSM) and Habre's FAN drew much attention from neighboring countries. Rabie maintains that, the initiation of the peace process describes all activities and arrangements to persuade adversaries to negotiate, prepare for negotiations and help construct a potentially successful process to settle conflict peacefully.¹⁷ Harold Saunders also emphasized the role of this phase in a peace process when he argued that it must include defining the problem, developing a commitment to negotiate and arranging the negotiations.¹⁸ In the Chadian conflict, Sudan, Niger and Libya tried unsuccessfully to sponsor reconciliation meeting between General Malloum and the rebel movements. These attempts were not successful because various factions in the conflict saw the

countries initiating the process as having an interest in the conflict and therefore doubted the sincerity of their initiatives. Nigeria, also a neighbor, however, play a crucial role in initiating the negotiations. Through five different conferences held in Kano and Lagos in 1979 and 1980, and three subsequent ones in Lome in 1980 and 1981, Nigeria took the lead in finding an African solution to this African problem. Nigeria's initial success in getting these factions to meet to negotiate was because it was perceived to be a non-interested party to the conflict. This initiative however, ran into problems when some factions (Habre and Goukouni) accused Nigeria of arming one of the factions (the Third Army - MPLT) and being dictatorial in the terms of the negotiations. In negotiations of this nature, the parties to the conflict should determine what they want to achieve. This led to a hold up of the third Kano Conference and the subsequent signing of the N'Djamena Accord by the factions without any mediators/negotiators.

To ensure a continuation of the reconciliation conferences, the role of Nigeria which was then doubtful, had to be passed to the OAU which was believed to be a broadbase institution that would be impartial as a mediator. At the Lagos II conference as many as ten OAU countries were represented on the conference with eleven Chadian factions participating to seek inclusion into the transitional government that was to be formed. Negotiations require tact, diplomacy, honesty, open mindedness, patience, fairness, effective communication and careful planning to be able to build consensus.

The negotiations were solutions oriented without giving due considerations to what the problems or interest of the parties were. At the first outbreak of fighting in 1979 between CSM and FAN/FAP factions, the main problem was the issue of North-South divide, and the agreement of power sharing in a transitional government was reasonably adequate. The problem that engineered the division within the original FROLINAT into different factions was the issue of Libyan involvement in Chadian affairs over the Aozou strip. Libya at the time of Lagos II

Accord was a party to this conflict. Extending mediation of the dispute to including Libya in a parallel peace process would have been a logical part of the peacemaking effort in Chad - all the more so because the internal war in Chad would have been impossible on any scale without a steady supply of foreign arms.¹⁹ It was therefore not surprising that from the initial stages of the formation of GUNT with Goukouni and Habre as President and Defense Minister respectively, there were clear signs of future difficulties. Habre's isolation from the other faction leaders, his disdain for practically all of them, his militant hostility to Libyan influence in Chad and his preference for a continued French presence,²⁰ indicated that the agreement concluded and signed in Lagos fell short of solving these grievances. Within five months of setting up GUNT, Goukouni's coalition forces were at war with Habre's FAN. Whether Habre was just ambitious of becoming the President and therefore his intransigence, could have been prevented if the negotiations had taken into consideration the bottom line needs of all parties, their concerns, fears and underlying interests.

The implementation of Lagos II Accord was not seriously pursued. Attention at this stage should have been focused on creating conducive conditions for peaceful co-existence and cooperation. The accord proposed a neutral force to monitor the implementation of the agreement, but this force was never assembled even though the government was formed. It was only the Congolese contingent that got to Chad but could not be effective in the absence of the other contingents. The Congolese eventually had to be evacuated back home when the second civil war broke out.

The African initiative of a political dialogue engineered by Nigeria and later pursued by the OAU, among the Chadian factions was a laudable idea of finding an African solution to an African problem. An enormous amount of diplomatic effort was employed in the course of holding at least a dozen formal meetings, several of them at the Heads of State level. The

initiative woefully failed because the mediators did not have a clear objective as to what they wanted to achieve at the end of it all. If the objective of the mediation and negotiation had been to stop the fighting and establish a lasting peace, the issue of Libyan influence in Chad which was a dividing line among most of the factions would have been discussed seriously. The mediation and negotiation efforts of Nigeria/OAU were in line with Rabies model in that a peace process was initiated which managed to bring the adversaries together to work out an agreement. The negotiations to conclude the agreement and implementation phases however, fell short of the model. There was no comprehensive negotiations among the parties and OAU to arrive at an agreement.

In conflict situations, agreements to resolve them must be feasible, acceptable and suitable. The agreements or plans arrived at should be feasible, in the sense that, they must be capable of being implemented and accomplished in terms of available time, space and resources. Unless agreements are workable, they will always fall short of promoting positive peace. The agreement must also be acceptable to all parties. The mutual acceptability of agreements is important to ending hostilities, establishing mutual trust and creating new conditions more conducive for cooperation. Lastly, the agreement should be suitable. To achieve this, agreements and mandates should clearly reflect the strategic goal of the mission to enable commanders map out their operational objectives clearly. Consequently, the poor negotiations resulted in an ambiguous mandate which was not feasible. The government of Goukouni (GUNT) had its own interpretation of this mandate which differed from that of the OAU force. The agreement was not equally acceptable to Habre's forces because they were not party to the signing of that agreement that mandated the force into Chad. The mandate was not also suitable as it only stressed on maintaining peace and stability in N'Djamena, without concern for the root causes of the conflict between Goukouni and Habre – the Libyan Factor.

The Principles of Peacekeeping Operations and the OAU Effort

In spite of the Lagos II Accord that demanding the dispatching of a peacekeeping force to Chad in 1979, this was not possible until November 1981, after the June 1981 Heads of State summit in Nairobi, Kenya, which was occasioned by the signing of the agreement of full unity between Chad and Libya. It has always been argued that this OAU effort was possible because of an external push by France which was anxious to prevent Qaddafi's ambition of setting up a greater Islamic state in West and Central Africa. In pursuit of this objective, France persuaded its former colonial territories and other members of the OAU with financial and logistic backing to support the idea of a Pan African force in Chad. The force replaced the Libyan intervention force in the Chadian conflict on 3 November 1981. The following paragraphs will address the Chadian OAU mission and the underlying principles of peace support operations.

Clear Objective. To avoid misinterpretation not only by the host nation and government or factions in a dispute, and to ensure the impartiality of the force, the mandate of must always be clearly defined, precise and unambiguous. Rabie's model maintains that the mutual acceptance of a proposed plan by all parties and the third party negotiators helps in defining the objectives realistically.²¹ A comprehensive approach to negotiations involves all parties to the conflict and thus address all legitimate grievances and fears in the course of the process leading to a comprehensive solution. The Pan African force in Chad had the mandate "to ensure the defense and security of Chad whilst awaiting the integration of its government forces."²² The agreement also stipulated that the force could only be deployed at the official request of the Republic of Chad. The Chadian government had the opportunity to make its choice as regards the composition of the force.²³ By the Nairobi Agreement, the OAU force was to assist the GUNT in a bid to maintain peace and stability, and this was the understanding that Goukouni and his government had. The mandate was however, changed when Habre came into the scene. The

force mandate was then to separate the warring factions in the country. The affirmation of the force of its neutrality and Goukouni's insistence that the force was to offer military support to GUNT against Habre led to a deterioration in relations between the Pan African force and GUNT. Hissene Habre took advantage of the new mandate and wrangling between GUNT and the OAU force to consolidate his forces and launched attacks on the government forces with active connivance of the contingent from Senegal.²⁴

The Pan African force lost credibility with the government because of its inability to go by the tenets of the Nairobi agreement as interpreted by Goukouni. Goukouni in an interview with Afrique-Asia Magazine published on 13 September 1982, stated that:

At first, the inter-African force adopted a very good attitude; defending its zones and categorically stopping any push by the FAN. But after the Nairobi summit, Nigeria ceded its positions. The Nigerian forces began to campaign politically for Habre among the GUNT fighters. The Nigerian military chiefs went so far as to ask the GUNT Chief of Staff; why not think of negotiating with Habre? Why do you continue to support Gunkouni? . . . The Zairean contingent adopted a similar attitude at Ati . . . FAN elements were even able to infiltrate the capital with the aid of the Pan-African forces.²⁵

The vagueness of the mandate contributed to the force loss of direction and subsequently its perceived partial status. The OAU force which was put in place with financial and logistic backing from France and United States, must have been influenced in its actions by the financiers. France and United States were interested in getting Libyan influence out of Chad, and as long as she withdrew her forces from Chad, France definitely still wanted the Libyan ally (GUNT) also out. It was therefore not surprising that immediately Habre captured the capital - N'Djamena, the OAU force also withdrew the same month.

Legitimacy. The OAU Peacekeeping Force to Chad was legitimate since it was a subject of a resolution passed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments (authority of the OAU) at the Nairobi summit in June 1981. There was also a formal memorandum of agreement between the legal authority of Chad (GUNT), and the OAU represented by its chairperson, Arap

Moi and the Secretary-General, Edem Kodjo, which meant the government of Chad consented to the replacement of the Libyan force with the OAU force. The force was a classical UN type peacekeeping force which entailed physical occupation of zones through the establishment and manning of observation posts, check points, road blocks, twenty-four hour patrols, preventing armed elements from entering the area of operation and cordon and search.²⁶ A number of factors created problems from the onset. At the signing of the Memorandum of Agreement, there was no fighting between Habre and Goukouni's forces. However, at the time the force was to deploy after Libyan withdrawal, the fighting had resumed again, but no cease fire agreement was signed between the factions (Habre and Goukouni), thus there was no arranged peace to keep.²⁷ The agreement signed between OAU and GUNT mandating the force did not include Habre's FAN, and therefore no terms were binding on him (Habre). Another agreement involving all the factions consent needed to be arranged again when fighting broke out.

Security. Security in peace operations emphasizes force protection as well as attaining a stable and secure environment. The force deployed in Chad was more concerned with force protection to the detriment of stability of the whole area of operation. Coupled with lack of resources, it was difficult for contingents to deploy to areas that the situation demanded them to be. When they did deploy, it was normally several days or weeks late.²⁸ The manner in which the Libyan force pulled out of Chad created a security problem for the OAU force. By the time the OAU force arrived in Chad, Habre's forces had made determined in roads into the areas previously controlled by the Libyan troops.²⁹ Towards the end of December Habre's forces had taken Oum Hadjer, and in January they were reported to have infiltrated into Mango and Guera,³⁰ approaching the capital, N'Djamena. The strength of the force at its maximum was composed of five maneuver battalions. This small force was expected to cover an area of 501,100 square miles; an average of 100,200 square miles of territory was the size of an area of responsibility of

a battalion. In comparison, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) had about ten battalions to cover a territory of only 3,927 square miles.³¹ The failure of troops contributing countries to honor their pledges created deployment problems and reduced considerably the effectiveness of the force in providing the necessary security as per the new mandate. These factors tilted the security balance in favor of Habre who was by this time well equipped in military hardware. Habre's forces did not therefore have problems of getting through the OAU force areas of operation to capture the capital, N'Djamena.

Unity of Effort. Poor planning and coordination prevented the force from starting off effectively. The deployment of troops was done haphazardly because of lack of cooperation from troop contributing states and poor coordination by the OAU Secretariat. Of the six countries that initially agreed to contribute troops, only Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire fulfilled their promises. Benin, Guinea and Togo failed to contribute troops as a result of lack of logistic support and effective communication from the OAU Secretariat.³² There was lack of effective communication between the OAU Secretariat in Addis Ababa and the Force Headquarters in Chad. The Secretary-General's representative in Chad was often unaware of events at the headquarters, due to unreliable communication. Throughout the duration of OAU peacekeeping mission in Chad, there were no substantial military directives to the force by the Secretary-General. Periodical operational reports that should have been regularly given by the secretariat to the Authority of OAU or Council of Ministers were not issued.³³ The old saying that he who pays the piper calls the tune was evident during this operation. Since the OAU was unable to shoulder the financial and other obligations of the contingents, the troops contributing countries were under no obligation to execute its mandate in Chad. Some contingents blatantly refused to proceed to their areas of operation as designated by the Force Commander because their respective governments gave them counter instructions.³⁴ Whenever military directives were

given by the Force Commander contingents first informed their home governments and awaited approval. Strategies which were laid down by the OAU political organs such as the Council of Ministers or Assembly of Heads of State, with respect to the operation were interpreted differently by the contingents in accordance with the instructions from their home governments.³⁵ The force eventually had no unified command system and a direction of purpose as each contingent did what suited its political and financial sponsors, and not focused on the mission to be accomplished.

Restraint. The OAU force, because of command and control problems, coupled with the interferences of the home governments , was over restrained. Where and when the force was supposed to act, it did not, and this resulted in Habre's faction infiltrating through its area of operations to take the capital.

Other Issues

Other factors aside the principles of peacekeeping that contribute to success in peacekeeping need to be mentioned. Adequate administrative and logistic support is basic to the success of any peacekeeping operation. In Chad the provision of administrative and logistic support for the mission was ignored by OAU. Troop contributing nations were entirely responsible for the logistic requirements of their troops, the only exception being the green berets and cap badges OAU issued to the force at the tail end of the operation.³⁶ The incapacity of the OAU to sponsor and finance the operation created most of the innumerable problems of command and control and the interference of national governments with the functions of the force.

Lessons Learned

According to Rabie, for a peace process to start off meaningfully, it must begin with a political dialogue that will define the problem, develop a commitment to negotiate and arrange

the negotiations. It is the process that brings factions together in systematic dialogue, to design a sequence of interactive steps that might remove those obstacles. Nigeria's unilateral attempts in the beginning of the crisis succeeded in getting these parties to eventually meet. The process initiated by Nigeria led to the first and second meeting in Kano. Nigeria was seen initially as non interested party to the conflict and that must have been a crucial factor in its ability to get the parties into a dialogue. Nigeria however showed interest in some of the factions by arming them and therefore lost its impartial status and credibility as a mediator, which resulted in the boycott of Kano III and the signing of the N'Djamena Accord.

A third party mediator to a conflict should not be party or suspected to have interest in the conflict. To get the conflicting factions back to the negotiation table, the mediation body was expanded to include nine other African countries: Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Liberia, Libya, Niger, Senegal and Sudan,³⁷ and this convinced the adversaries to return to the negotiation conference. The backing given to Nigeria by the OAU and the expansion of the number of countries in the mediation body minimized the suspicion of partiality and facilitated the signing of Lagos II which led to the forming of GUNT. Initiating the peace process is very vital if conflicts are to be resolved systematically and peacefully but the initiator must have credibility in the eyes of the adversaries. The negotiation process itself must address the cause of the problem if a lasting solution is expected. The bone of contention between Goukouni and Habre was the issue of Libyan influence in the domestic affairs of Chad. Unfortunately this issue was not addressed in the Lagos II Accord, and that problem eventually led to the outbreak of another civil war between Goukouni and Habre in March 1980.

The success of any peacekeeping mission depends on whether the force knows exactly what they are to do, and who to deal with. The mission statement of the force must be very clear

and unambiguous in the mandate. The mandate given to the Pan African force was ambiguous leaving the force and the GUNT to interpret the objective the way each wanted.

To compound the problem of an ambiguous mandate, was the lack of political direction and advice to the mission. The Secretary-General's representative in Chad was often unaware of events at the headquarters due to unreliable communication channels. Although the Secretary-General paid a three-day visit to Chad, it was doubtful if he had an operations cell at the secretariat to monitor the operations in Chad.³⁸ Peacekeeping operations are diplomatic in nature, and need political and diplomatic directions more than the military might. The lack of unified political direction allowed individual contributing countries to dictate the actions of their troops.

Another factor which obviously affected the operation of the force was the issue of logistics. The OAU Secretariat failed to provide the funds and logistics to run the operation. Each contributing state was therefore responsible for all the needs of its contingents; funds, transport, food, allowances, medical facilities, etc. According to Lieutenant General Erskine,³⁹ such extra responsibilities on contributing countries, make it look as if participation in OAU sponsored peacekeeping mission is a punishment.⁴⁰ It was therefore difficult for the authority of the OAU to exercise control over the troops because of the organization's inability to fund the force, thereby forfeiting its moral and political right to dictate to it. This made the Force Commander lose control over the contingents to their respective countries, which definitely affected unity of effort of the force. Centralized logistic support for multinational operations of this kind is vital to the sustainment and successful implementation of its mandate.

An examination of a similar conflict situation in Liberia in the next chapter will throw more light on the efforts by African organizations in conflict resolution and the associated problems.

¹Sam C. Nolutshungu, Limits of Anarchy: Interventions and State formation in Chad (Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia, 1996), 28.

²Ibid., 33.

³Ibid., 50.

⁴Ibid., 65.

⁵Ibid., 103.

⁶Ibid., 109.

⁷Funmi Olonisakin, "African Homemade Peacekeeping Initiatives," in Armed Forces and Society 23, no. 3 (Spring 1997): 351.

⁸Nolutshungu, 95.

⁹Ibid., p. 104.

¹⁰Ibid., 112.

¹¹Ibid., 127.

¹²Ibid., 124.

¹³Olonisakin, 352.

¹⁴David A. Chambers, Peacekeeping and Challenges of Civil Conflict Resolution. (New Brunswick: University of New Brunswick Centre for Conflict Studies, 1992), 115.

¹⁵Ibid., 117.

¹⁶Olonisakin, 352.

¹⁷Rabie Mohammed, Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1994), 87.

¹⁸Harold Saunders, "We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation." Negotiation Journal (1985): 12.

¹⁹Nolutshungu, 134.

²⁰Ibid., 133

²¹Rabie, 116.

²²Charters, 115.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid., 117.

²⁵Nolutshungu, 171.

²⁶Olonisakin, 352.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Amadu Sesay, “Peacekeeping by Regional Organizations : The OAU and ECOWAS Peacekeeping Forces in Comparative Perspective,” in David A Charters, Peacekeeping and the Challenges of Civil Conflict Resolution (New Brunswick: University of New Brunswick Center for Conflict Studies, 1992), 127.

²⁹Nolutshungu, 164.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹R. Kuplati, “The Nigerian Contingent in the Organization of African Unity Peacekeeping Operation in Chad,” Nigeria in International Peacekeeping. 1980-92 (Lagos and London: Malthouse, 1993), 149.

³²Ibid., 146

³³Olonisakin, 354.

³⁴Charters, 172.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Kupolati, 150.

³⁷Nolutshungu, 132.

³⁸Kupolati, 149.

³⁹General Erskine was one time the Force Commander of UNIFIL--Lebanon.

⁴⁰Charters, 126.

CHAPTER FOUR

CASE STUDY--LIBERIA CONFLICT, 1990-91

Background

After the abolition of the slave trade, American philanthropists arranged for American freed slaves to be settled outside America, where they could have their natural and inalienable rights as a people. One of such group of freed slaves found themselves settling in Liberia in 1821. For some twenty years after settling in Liberia, the settler community struggled with the local tribes, sometimes in very brutal campaigns to establish control over them. In July of 1847, representatives of the people of the Commonwealth of Liberia, in convention assembled, declared themselves independent and constituted the Republic of Liberia.¹ This settler group commonly known as the Americo-Liberian group, imposed a colonial situation on the natives whom they met on the land. From independence, Liberia had been governed by an exclusionist oligarchy imbued with a sense of "the civilian mission."²

According to David Wippman:

The Americo-Liberian . . . recreated the social hierarchy they had experienced in the antebellum south of the United States, but with themselves as the socially dominant, landowning class. They considered the indigenous population primitive and uncivilized, and treated it as little more than an abundant source of freed labor.³

As elaborated by Ofuatey-Kodjoe, the objective of the:

Settler oligarchy was to maintain its domination over the indigenous population. Not surprisingly, this system was maintained by extreme economic exploitation including forced and slave labor and brutal repression of the indigenous peoples. In this pattern of repression, the repatriates used a policy of "divide and rule" and recruiting armed forces along ethnic lines and deploying them to brutalize other ethnic groups.⁴

Powerful institutions like the True Whig Party and the Masonic Lodge were the Americo-Liberian tools for repressing the indigenous Liberians. The True Whig Party won every election organized in Liberia between 1877 and 1980. To mitigate the poverty and illiteracy of the native

population, President William Tubman (last but one Presidents before the crisis) introduced reforms after World War II to integrate the local population into the social and political mainstream of the country. This led to the emergence of a native elite class then competing with the Americo-Liberians for power and wealth. The struggle for power further deepened the division in the country as power aspirants looked for support from their social and ethnic groups. The Americo-Liberians depended on the lodges and political families that existed, and the natives also relied on their ethnic groupings.

President William Tolbert, the last of the Americo-Liberian Presidents, took over a corrupt economy and a divided country in 1971. To subdue the native elite and even Americo-Liberians who opposed him, President Tolbert resorted to the use of force to assert his authority. It was in the wake of these ethnic and social divisions, economic depression and suppression of political opposition that led to a bloody coup d'etat by Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe, a native Liberian on 12 April 1980. Master Sergeant Doe, thus became the first native Liberian to become President, and this was seen as the fulfillment of justice of all native Liberians.

The Crisis: Initiating Events

The strong feeling of joy and relief that welcomed Doe's takeover did not last long when he began the implementation of repressive policies and breeding deep ethnic divisions among the indigenous Liberian population. He favored members of his Krahn ethnic group and their Mandingo cohorts and suppressed any likely opposition to his rule. The Krahn-dominated Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) was his instrument of oppression of the Liberian people.⁵ It was Doe's ill-fated attempt to supplant Americo-Liberian imperialism with its native Liberian version, termed "Krahn Imperialism," that resulted in the series of conflicts that metamorphosed into a full blown civil war by 1990.⁶

Doe initially saw what was left of the Americo-Liberian political elite as his immediate threat to power and unleashed terror on them. During the early days of his regime, he executed thirteen of the country's most prominent politicians on Monrovia public beach.⁷ His executions were not restricted to the Americo-Liberians alone: he perpetrated similar acts to perceived enemies within the army, civil organizations and his government. It was therefore not surprising that from his ascension to power to 1988, there were as many as seven reported cases of attempted coups and attempts on his life.

Another political miscalculation of Doe's regime was his rigging of the 1985 election for himself and his National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL). His rigging of the elections and other related matters were some of the contributing factors to the abortive coup organized by Doe's second in command in the ruling Peoples Redemption Council, Brigadier General Thomas Quiwonkpa. Brigadier General Quiwonkpa could not escape the blood thirsty "kill squads" of President Doe. He was killed and his mutilated body put on public show through the streets of Monrovia. Thereafter, Doe's attention was focused on the Brigadier's ethnic group - Gios and Manos. After these incidents Doe employed all measures to ensure he remained in power. Foremost among them being:

the banning of political parties and associations; the purging and summary execution of many high officials in his government suspected of being influential; and increasing dependence on a top hierarchy of people in the armed forces (AFL), the Executive Mansion Guard, and the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit (SATU), all belonging to his Krahn ethnic group.⁸

By 1989, the Doe regime had become very unpopular because of the atrocities and the dictatorial tendencies of the government. It had further deepened the divisions amongst ethnic Krahn tribesmen and his targeted tribes. Mr. Charles Taylor, a one time Doe's ally and a minister in the regime who escaped from Doe's charges of embezzlement earlier, had formed a guerrilla movement - the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), and there was no other opportune

time for him to strike than this period. On 24 December 1989 (Christmas Eve) a full blown guerrilla warfare had erupted in Liberia through Nimba County. Allegations of genocide followed AFL slaughter of civilians from the Gio and Nano tribes in Nimba County, whom they accused of supporting the rebellion.⁹ Doe's AFL further shocked the civilized world with the July 1990 massacre of refugee-seeking women and children in the premises of a Lutheran Church in the outskirts of Monrovia.¹⁰

The decline in international interest in Africa, and particularly Liberia was confirmed by the failure of the International Community to respond swiftly to the Liberian crisis. The delay in response left African countries no other option than to solve their own security problems. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) of which Liberia is a member had to take the initiative after mediation by local Liberian Organization (the Inter-faith Mediation Committee) had failed.

The ECOWAS Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Efforts

The Peacemaking initiative of ECOWAS was initially raised at the ECOWAS Summit Meeting in Banjul, Gambia. The summit meeting, concerned about the wanton loss of lives, destruction of property, total breakdown of law and order, and general suffering of the people of Liberia, felt it was morally bound to take some actions to bring the situation under control. Accordingly, the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC),¹¹ was officially formed by the ECOWAS authority with the task of working out an approach to solving the crisis in Liberia. The Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Dr. Abbas Bundu, drafted the guidelines that were to be discussed at a SMC Ministerial Conference for promulgation by the SMC Heads of State and Governments. These guidelines include:

1. That all parties to the conflict accept the ECOWAS mediatory role;
2. That the warring parties agree to an immediate cease-fire;

3. That ECOWAS monitor the cease-fire;
4. That all parties agree to stop the destruction of life and property;
5. That the government of Samuel Doe lift the ban on all political parties and release political prisoners;
6. That the parties agree to establish an interim administration, and hold national elections as soon as practicable to elect a substantive government;
7. That the parties agree to constitute an Electoral Commission which commands the confidence of the parties and which would supervise the elections.
8. That ECOWAS observe the elections to ensure that they are conducted freely and fairly.¹²

Despite disagreements between the SMC Ministerial Conference and some of the factions, particularly the NPFL of Mr. Taylor on most of the provisions in these guidelines, the SMC Summit Conference attended by Heads of State of SMC countries, ECOWAS Executive Secretary, OAU Secretary General, Representatives of Interfaith Mediation Committee and Lieutenant General Arnold Quainoo, the first Force Commander, adopted it and passed it as a resolution known as Decision A/Dec. 1/8/90 in ECOWAS circles. The resolution stipulated among others that parties to the conflict ceased-fire and that ECOMOG (ECOWAS Cease fire Monitoring Group) shall be composed of military contingents drawn from member states of the SMC, including Guinea and Sierra Leone. ECOWAS went on further to convene another conference of over fifty delegates comprising Liberian Political and civil organizations in Benjul, the Gambia, to elect representatives to form the Interim Government. Notable among the parties and organizations that attended were the National Democratic Party of Liberia (Doe's Party), the Liberian Council of Churches, Liberian Muslim Congress and the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (Prince Yormie Johnson's INPFL). Prominently absent was Mr. Taylor's NPFL.

Dr. Amos Sawyer and Bishop Ronald Diggs were elected President and Vice President respectively with other ministers coming from the rest of the groups represented.

ECOWAS also went ahead despite objections from some factions and dispatch an ECOMOG force of 2,500 troops from Nigeria (800), Ghana (800), Guinea (500), Sierra Leone (300) and Gambia (100) dubbed Operation Liberty, into Liberia on 24 August 1990 under the command of General Quainoo. Appendix B is a chronology of major events that characterized the ECOWAS Peace Initiative.¹³

Rabie's Model and ECOWAS Peacemaking Plan

The ECOWAS authority must have taken note of the problems and shortcomings of the mediation efforts at getting the Chadian factions to negotiate an agreement when they decided to set up the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) of four heads of state (Gambia – by then the Chairman of ECOWAS, Nigeria, Ghana and Togo). This was to prevent a single country or Head of State taking up the mantle of negotiation only to be accused of partiality. The SMC, from the broadness of its composition definitely had the chance of working out a more objective negotiation program to be followed. It was the duty of this committee to persuade the adversaries to negotiate, and help construct a potentially successful process to settle the conflict peacefully.

Initiating the process or the political dialogue phase according to Rabie's Model has the express purpose of bringing together the representatives of conflicting parties to directly or indirectly work jointly to explore new ways to narrow the gaps and reduce the contentious issues that separate them, while preparing for negotiations to resolve conflict.¹⁴

The SMC Ministerial Meeting held in July 1990 with representatives of the various factions in the conflict was the initiation of the process. At this meeting, the eight point ECOWAS Peace plan (outlined in an earlier paragraph) was what participants were to deliberate on, and submit for endorsement by the Heads of State of SMC. Setting out the guidelines for the

process was appropriate since they were going to serve as the focus of the mediators. The adversaries were not bound to accept them as the SMC expected. This was the stage for adversaries to work out how they wanted to settle their differences. From the onset, the process was faced with objections by the adversaries, particularly the NPFL of Mr. Charles Taylor. This conference ended with no accepted agreements on the guidelines, either between the adversaries or the adversaries and the SMC Ministerial group. Despite these disagreements, the Ministerial Committee of SMC went ahead and submitted the guidelines for approval. The Heads of State and governments of the SMC at their summit on 6-7 August 1990 in Banjul, the Gambia, in the absence of the warring factions adopted the contentious provisions in the Ministerial guidelines as the ECOWAS peace plan. In justifying this action, Dr. Obed Asamoah argues that:

The Liberian situation has now assumed international dimensions because several thousand Chadians, Nigerians and other nationals have been holed up in Liberia and are suffering because of the fighting. We do not have to look at the interest of the warring factions alone but also at the interest of the neighboring countries.¹⁵

General Lansana Conte, the Guinean President also stated:

We do not need the permission of any party involved in the conflict to implement the decisions reached in Banjul. So, with or without the agreement of any of the parties, ECOWAS troops will be in Liberia.¹⁶

There were clear objections to this agreement by the factions. President Doe accused ECOWAS leaders of meddling in the internal affairs of Liberia.¹⁷ Tom Woewiyu, the spokesman for Taylor's NPFL stated that, if there was any attempt at peacekeeping from any part of the world, they (NPFL) would not allow that force to enter.¹⁸

In negotiations and peacekeeping, consent of the factions is vital to the successful implementation of the terms. The fact that there was disagreements during the political dialogue phase (initiation of the process), and no subsequent conferences were held to map out the negotiations, is a clear testimony that there were no negotiation to conclude any agreements. In the absence of the first two phases of Rabie's Model, it is doubtful how the third phase

(implementation of the agreement) could have been achieved. There was no cease-fire between the factions, and the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) that moved into Monrovia on 24 August 1990, had no peace to keep. Rebel factions and indeed the government forces continued atrocities, arguing in some cases that they were not under any obligation to honor international agreements to which they were not signatories.¹⁹ ECOMOG at the initial entry into Monrovia had to fight its way in, and at various stages during the operation clashed with Mr. Taylor's NPFL. It was because the negotiations were not systematically conducted and the agreement lacked the consent of the parties, particularly the NPFL, that the mandate of the force was not very clear. One could not tell whether the mission was a peacekeeping or peace enforcement one.

Assessing the ECOWAS peace plan in 1990 for Liberia, it was definitely not a feasible one. It did not stand a chance of being implemented. The plan talked of forming an interim government and organizing free and fair elections in the country without a mention of disarmament and demobilization. The force deployed by ECOWAS was not even capable of securing the capital, Monrovia. To faithfully organize free and fair elections, the forces needed to be disarmed and demobilized with ECOMOG controlling the whole country to prevent any armed elements using their arms to intimidate the electorate. Secondly, the plan from the start was not acceptable to the parties. Taylor's NPFL objected to the plan and the intervention. However, the plan addressed the root causes of the problem, that is , trying to return the country to democracy.

ECOMOG and the Principles of Peace Operations

The ECOMOG force drawn from Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Gambia was dispatched into Monrovia on 24 August 1990 to implement the ECOWAS peace plan. The principles of peace operations have proven to be useful and contribute to the high level of effectiveness and efficiency of other operations elsewhere. ECOMOG operations will therefore be viewed in line with these proven principles.

Legitimacy. ECOMOG intervention in the Liberian crisis was viewed by some factions in Liberia and even countries in West Africa as not legitimate. Legitimacy is a function of the consent of the parties to the conflict. The higher the degree of legitimacy ascribed to the force by the international community and parties to the conflict, the greater is the likelihood of success. The West African Heads of State and governments at their 1981 summit meeting in Sierra Leone ratified the protocol relating to mutual assistance on defense, which not only forbade all acts of subversion, hostility or aggression directed at a member-state, but considered them as constituting a threat or aggression against the entire community.²⁰ By this provision, ECOWAS felt justified to intervene in the affairs of Liberia because it is the “Sub-Regional Authority.” In operations of this nature, however, the authority vested in the ECOWAS Summit by the Defense Protocol was not enough for it to unilaterally take a decision to intervene in the Liberian crisis. The consent of the parties to the conflict was very important if the force was to play its third party impartial supervisory role successfully. This was not the case with ECOMOG. The NPFL of Mr. Taylor had objected to the intervention because it doubted the impartial status of the force. Even though President Doe and the INPFL of Prince Johnson were in favor of the intervention, the disagreement by one faction needed to be taken into consideration in the final decision to move in. “Operation Liberty” therefore started without the consent of all the factions, nor was there a cease-fire.

On its arrival in Monrovia, ECOMOG was seen as a party to the conflict by the NPFL, and was therefore attacked, getting ECOMOG embroiled in the conflict, which complicated the problem it had gone in to help resolve. The damage to ECOMOG’s perceived legitimacy due to the lack of consent, prejudiced the contingent’s security and protection as well as its ability to supervise or monitor the belligerent activities. ECOMOG went into Liberia to keep peace when there was no peace to keep, and therefore found itself searching for the peace in a more costly

manner. The question of legitimacy threatened the unity of ECOWAS. As the Ghanaian Peoples Daily Graphic put it, the “Liberian Crisis, especially the question of legitimacy and role of the ECOMOG force poses a threat to the unity of the community as the francophone countries seem not to favor the anglophone-dominated force.”²¹

Clear Objective. The mandate given to ECOMOG was nebulous. The mandate initially was simply to “keep the peace, restore law and order and ensure respect for the cease-fire.”²² This mandate could not be implemented because there was no peace. There was no peace to keep because the agreement was not a negotiated one as Rabie’s model anticipates. There were disagreements during the negotiations, which led to a break in the talks. There was no concluded agreement between the factions and the force, and therefore no cease fire before the force moved in. There was continuous fighting amongst all the factions, with ECOMOG as a target of the NPFL. ECOMOG also had a mission to secure and evacuated displaced civilians in Monrovia. This could not also be carried out because of the fighting and absence of any cease-fire; troops were therefore mandated to use force to secure Monrovia and restore essential services such as water and electricity.²³ This change in mandate saw ECOMOG as an active participant in the crisis, as ECOMOG fighters were deployed in joint operations with President Doe’s AFL and Prince Johnson’s INPFL in a bid to dominate Monrovia. The battles to control Monrovia continued until November 1990 when a semblance of a cease-fire was signed. ECOWAS perhaps thought that it had an overwhelming force and was therefore capable of forcing the NPFL to accept a cease-fire, but that did not work. The change in mandate and the active involvement of ECOMOG in fighting indicated that ECOMOG was not a neutral third party as it claimed and that complicated any chances of arranging a cease-fire. The lack of a clear objective was perhaps because of the rush with which the mediation team tried to come out with an agreement. That a

cease-fire was arranged later was not because of the military approach adopted, but because of intense diplomatic maneuvers that were also going on concurrently.

Unity of Effort. To achieve the objective of securing peace in Liberia, there was the need to pull all resources and efforts of the West African Community, International Organizations (OAU and UN) and Non-Governmental Organizations to be successful. Within the ECOWAS community, there was a political division between anglophone and francophone countries . La Cote D'Ivoire and Burkina Faso supported Mr. Charles Taylor and were believed to be backing him financially and materially. The Burkinabe leader, Captain Blaise Compaore, to justify his support for Mr. Taylor's NPFL, stated that, "it was a moral duty to save Liberians from the wrath of a ruthless dictator (Doe)."²⁴ Burkina Faso and La Cote D'Ivoire did not support the ECOWAS initiative from the onset, and this division was a contributing factor to the inability of the mediators to arrange any cease-fire.

There was also the need for the military effort in Liberia to be complemented with a political direction. The position of political and legal advisers were not filled. ECOWAS's failure to maintain continued political presence (the Executive Secretary Representative) on the ground (in Liberia) placed greater burden on the Force Commander, who had to perform both political and military duties.²⁵ As remarked by Dr. Amos Sawyer, the first Interim President during the crisis, "One weakness of ECOMOG is that there is no political office side by side . . . Peacekeeping has a significantly military and political dimension, but the political dimension has been missing here."²⁶ Likewise, plans were not made for ECOMOG to work with civilian agencies responsible for administering humanitarian aid in Liberia, resulting in a number of conflicts between the force and some relief organizations.²⁷

Security. In peace operations, security emphasizes force protection against any form of hostile acts or groups and the stability of the area of operation. The security of the force is

significantly enhanced by its perceived legitimacy and impartiality, the mutual respect built between the force and the other parties involved in the peace operation, and the forces credibility in the international arena.²⁸ The ECOMOG force initially lacked legitimacy and impartiality and therefore relied on a robust self-defense strategy for survival. ECOMOG was repeatedly attacked by NPFL troops, who had opposed its deployment. The worse of these series of attacks by NPFL was that of October 1992, dubbed “Operation Octopus,” which nearly overran ECOMOG positions. These attacks compelled ECOMOG to be switching in its mission from peacekeeping, when there were no attacks, to peace enforcement anytime they were under attacks. Emphasis was placed on limited enforcement actions when the situation demanded, and this allowed the force to push the warring factions (NPFL) out of the capital, Monrovia.

The achievement of ECOMOG in maintaining security was aptly described by Margaret Vogt:

The adoption of a strategy of limited offensive by ECOMOG should be viewed within the perspective of the complete paralysis of social order in Liberia. Electricity, water supply and other social services had been cut off making Monrovia a depressing disease-infested grave yards, . . . with no food and with people unable to move from one end of the town to another. The liberation of the central power plant and main water works from the rebel forces (NPFL) and their reactivation, was one of the major objectives sought through the adoption of minimum enforcement action. The NPFL, which was the most hostile of the rebel groups to the multinational force was driven out of the Artillery firing range of the Monrovia region.²⁹

This strategy was able to reduce the carnage in Monrovia, enabling humanitarian organizations to resume their operations of relief supplies.

Restraint. Circumstances at the time of the deployment made it difficult for the force to go by her original rules of engagement, which were more appropriate for peacekeeping operations. Attacks on ECOMOG on the first day compelled the force to adopt peace enforcement actions immediately. This initial approach prejudiced the force’s subsequent efforts at achieving a settlement between the factions. NPFL, which bore the brunt of most of

ECOMOG's military actions was therefore skeptical about the genuine intentions of the force and the peace process in general.

Other Issues

ECOMOG operations in Liberia were hampered by a number of other reasons. Notable among such constraints are lack of cooperation from the factions, insufficient logistical backing and lack of committed support from the international community.

Lack of Cooperation of Factions. The lack of cooperation of Liberia's belligerent factions with ECOMOG was a major impediment in its quest to establish peace in Liberia. This again goes back to the element of consent which was lacking in the agreement. Over twelve agreements were signed by these factions and broken by the same people. There was absolute lack of faith on the part of the leaders of the factions to the return of peace to Liberia. Closely related to the lack of cooperation of factions was the lack of cooperation of some member countries of ECOWAS. Burkina Faso and La Cote D'Ivoire were known supporters of the rebel leader Charles Taylor. The actions of Burkina Faso and La Cote D'Ivoire almost split ECOWAS into separate groups of anglophone and francophone. However, with high level diplomatic scheming, these countries were eventually pulled-in to form part of the negotiation team (Committee of Nine-namely the SMC plus Burkina Faso, La Cote D'Ivoire, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau and Mali). When Mr. Charles Taylors backers became part of the mediation process, the NPFL was more cooperative.

Lack of Logistical Support. ECOWAS Secretariat promised to take over the logistic support to all contingents after thirty days of the operation, but failed to meet this requirement of the force, making a centralized logistic control impossible. There was therefore a huge gap of difference in the support of each contingent as it became each contributing country's responsibility. As General Olurin, ECOMOG's fifth Field Commander remarked: "The lack of

centralized logistic has inherent command and control problems for the commander. Besides, it is bad for morale of troops who share the same accommodation or office or check points to have different standards of feeding and welfare amenities.”³⁰

Lack of Committed Support from International Community. It cannot be discounted that there was lack of support from the international community including the rest of Africa for the West African effort. Despite persistent efforts by the UN to raise funds for the implementation of the peace process, the world body has not been able to perform as credibly as was expected of it. As President Rawlings of Ghana, then the Chairman of ECOWAS stated: “We cannot help being struck by the fact that the international community is willing to spend \$5 million a day on UN Peacekeeping operations in Bosnia but when we (ECOWAS) asked for a sum that represents 10 to 15 days of that bill to help those of us in Africa making every effort possible to assist ourselves with our meager resources, there is deafening silence.”³¹

A number of African countries expressed interest to assist the ECOWAS effort with troops but were not capable of supporting themselves financially and logistically.

No Standardized Training. The standard of training of various nations making up the ECOWAS force varied. Peacekeeping requires a different type of training from conventional warfighting, particularly when it involves contingents of different countries (multinational force). The time interval between the call-up of the force and its deployment into Liberia was too short for any uniform training to have been conducted. Contingents’ operational experiences in peacekeeping and enforcement actions were therefore vital to their ability to perform creditably. It was clearly evident in the performance of most of the contingents that they lacked the basic prerequisites for peacekeeping duties. This problem compounded the overall performance of the force towards achieving its desire end state.

Lessons Learned

It became apparent to ECOWAS during the course of its peace negotiations that there was the need to ensure all interested parties to the conflict are involved in finding a solution to the problem. Initially, the peace process which was championed by Nigeria and her anglophone partners saw only the factions in Liberia to be the groups to deal with, while ignoring the others outside the country that were assisting and supporting the NPFL of Charles Taylor. The ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee that was formed to initiate and conduct the negotiations left out Burkina Faso and La Cote D'Ivoire. It was obvious that La Cote D'Ivoire was a sympathizer to NPFL since the insurgency was launched from that country. The Burkinabe President was known to have declared his support for the overthrow of President Doe, who he described as a ruthless dictator.

The absence of these countries from the SMC made the NPFL suspicious of the fairness of the terms of the agreement and therefore its objection. The absence of his sympathizers on the negotiation team prevented the NPFL leader from personally attending the negotiation conferences. He was always however represented. Until the formation of the ECOWAS Committee of Five as part of the negotiation process, which comprised Burkina Faso and La Cote D'Ivoire, the NPFL never actively participated in the negotiation which contributed to the long and costly delay in the whole peace process. This fact brings out the point that in mediations and negotiations, there should always be a fair representation of all interest groups in the conflict if a realistic consensus is to be sought. This being the case, it was not surprising that the initial negotiations initiated in Banjul, the Gambia, could not agree on either a cease-fire, the deployment of ECOMOG or the interim government.

The effect of the absence of a cease-fire and the willing consent of all parties to the conflict for the deployment of a neutral force into the theater were very evident when ECOMOG

was directed to move into Liberia without these conditions. ECOMOG was seen as an “uninvited guest,” by the NPFL and therefore a party to the conflict. ECOMOG was frequently attacked by NPFL, and its fighting back, usually with overwhelming superior force and fire power, made it lose its impartial status as a neutral force and complicated the negotiation process. In the circumstances, ECOWAS adopted the “total or control approach” with the hope of getting the recalcitrant group (NPFL) back to the negotiations. This approach may succeed in ending violence, but it cannot establish peace. The best that it can do is to force conflict to become dormant, eliminating some of its manifestations and delaying its resumption.³² This was exactly the case in Liberia, when fighting could stop in some cases for over a year and resume. In Liberia, it was therefore clear that military power in conflict resolution could be resorted to as a last measure and not as the ultimate means to achieving a lasting settlement. Peace cannot be forced onto a people, it must be negotiated.

One lesson that was critical in the final success of arranging a peace deal was the involvement of the international community in the process. ECOWAS first thought that the Liberian problem was a West African issue that had to be solved by West Africans only. It turned out not to be the case. The decision of ECOWAS Heads of State to call for OAU member countries and the UN to subscribe troops and funds to support ECOMOG’s efforts was not only to increase its physical capacity to fulfill its mandate. It also increased the confidence base of its profile and operations and thus made it more acceptable by all parties as an instrument of peace and fair play.

Another lesson to planners of ECOMOG and peace operations in general, is the need to envisage a multifaceted role for such forces. Despite the scale of human tragedy and suffering that had occurred in Liberia, the planners neglected to take appropriate measures to deal with the refugees and displaced persons locked up in Liberia. When ECOMOG landed in Liberia and saw

the magnitude of the problem, it was overwhelmed and confused as there were no plans to deal with such issues. Equally ignored were plans to work with civilian agencies responsible for administering humanitarian aid in Liberia, resulting in a number of conflicts between the force and some of these organizations,³³ which goes to strengthen the need for civil-military co-operation and coordination in peace support operations.

¹M. Weller, ed., Regional Peacekeeping and International Enforcement: The Liberia Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), xix.

²Monday Akpan, "Black Imperialism: Americo-Liberian Rule Over the African Peoples in Liberia, 1841-1964," Canadian Journal of African Studies (1973), 217-236.

³David Wippman, "Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian-Civil War," in Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (New York: Council for Foreign Relations, 1993), 160.

⁴W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, "Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflicts: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia," paper presented at a workshop on Multilateral Organizations and the Amelioration of Ethnic Conflicts, held at the Ralph Bunche Institute on the United Nations, City University of New York, New York City, 14 May 1993, 5.

⁵Funmi Olonisakin, "African Homemade Peacekeeping Initiative," in Armed Forces and Society 25, no 3 (Spring 1977): 357

⁶Doe belonged to the Krahn tribe which, like the Americo-Liberian community, constitute about four percent of Liberia's population. See Wippman, "Enforcing the Peace," 162.

⁷Clement Adibe, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Liberia (New York: United Nations Publications, 1996), 8.

⁸Ofuatey-Kodjoe, 4-5.

⁹Adibe, 10.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹The Standing Mediation Committee originally comprised the Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo. The committee however, invited Liberia's neighbors: Guinea and Sierra Leone to participate in deliberations.

¹²Adibe, 20.

¹³Ibid., 51.

¹⁴Rabie, Mohammed, Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1994), 88.

¹⁵Dr. Obed Asamoah, quoted in the People's Daily Graphic (Accra), 23 August 1990, 1.

¹⁶Adibe, 24.

¹⁷Ibid., 26.

¹⁸Ibid., 27.

¹⁹Olonisakin, 359.

²⁰Adibe, 15.

²¹People's Daily Graphic (Accra), 27 November 1990, 9.

²²Amadu Sesay, "Peacekeeping by Regional Organizations: The OAU and ECOWAS Peacekeeping Forces in Comparative Perspective," in Peacekeeping and the Challenges of Civil Conflict Resolution, by David A. Charters (New Brunswick: University of New Brunswick Center for Conflict Studies, 1992), 115.

²³Ibid., 116.

²⁴Adibe, 29.

²⁵Olonisakin, 361.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid., 360.

²⁸US Army TRADOC FM 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington, D.C: Department of the Army, 1994), 17.

²⁹M.A. Vogt, "The Problems and Challenges of Peace-Making: From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement," in the Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG (Lagos: Gabumo Publishing Company, 1992), 155.

³⁰Olonisakin, 364.

³¹Amoa-Awua, "The Role of ECOWAS in Peacekeeping and Peacemaking" in Changes in International Politics and Implications for Peace in Africa, by Douglas K Zormelo and Peter Mayer (Accra: Inter-Participants Agencies, 1996), 120.

³²Rabie, 71.

³³Olonisakin, 360.

CHAPTER FIVE

CASE STUDY--LIBERIA CONFLICT, 1991-97

Introduction

The first ECOWAS initiative to resolve the conflict in Liberia, from the standpoint of the principles of peacekeeping, was not neutral and therefore lacked credibility, as ECOWAS found itself actively fighting the forces of Mr. Taylor. ECOMOG, from these developments was seen as party to the conflict, thereby jeopardizing ECOWAS's moral justification as a faithful third party mediator and negotiator to continue the peace process. Despite the lack of credibility, ECOWAS did not abandon the process but persevered. This eventually led to the signing of an agreement which brought democratic elections and relative peace in July 1997. This chapter will look at how ECOWAS approached the peace process after its initial shortcomings from mid 1991-97.

The absence of a consensus among ECOWAS member countries on the SMC peace plan and the continued support of Mr. Taylor's NPFL by La Cote D'Ivoire and Burkina Faso had created a division between the anglophone and francophone countries in ECOWAS, and served as a block to effective negotiations from the initial stages. By June 1991, the negotiating body had been expanded with the forming of the Committee of Five¹ amongst mostly the francophone countries chaired by President Houphouet Biogny of La Cote D'Ivoire.

Renewed Initiative

Lome Agreement. Since the signing of the ceasefire agreement on 28 November 1990 in Bamako among the warring factions and the Interim Government, there was some amount of calm observed throughout the country. With the relative calm existing, the peacemaking efforts resumed. This time, a unilateral attempt was made by President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo, as a member of the committee of five in February 1991 for the parties to reaffirm their commitment to the ceasefire agreement. The Lome Agreement, signed on 1 March 1991 was a major step

forward as it stipulated assembly areas for each respective faction. It further gave ECOMOG additional tasks of disarming all the factions and registering all troops with a view to initiating a process of rehabilitation. The factions further reaffirmed their earlier decision to hold an All Liberian Parties Conference on 15 March 1991 in Monrovia to establish a transitional government. The Lome Agreement became the crux of the ECOWAS' new mediation plan.² As planned, the All Liberian Parties Conference was held with the conspicuous absence of Mr. Charles Taylor. However, deliberations went on unabated, and Dr Amos Sawyer was reelected as the country's Interim President.

The lull in fighting due to the ceasefire saw the consolidation of Taylor's forces who refused to be disarmed, and fighting began across the border into Sierra Leone. To complicate the already confused situation was the emergence of another faction; the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) – a coalition of the Krahn and Mandingo(tribes) supporters of the Late President Doe who had fled into Sierra Leone. This group and Taylor's NPFL started having clashes along the border area, thereby violating the existing ceasefire. Of course, ULIMO at this time was not party to the signed ceasefire agreement.

The Yamoussoukro Agreements. As a way of involving the countries supporting NPFL, ECOWAS dropped the mediation process in the court of the Committee of Five, which resulted in a series of conferences in Yamoussoukro in La Cote D'Ivoire. Yamoussoukro I, attended by the SMC countries, the Committee of Five, the Interim President and all the factions (less ULIMO) on 30 June 1991, resulted in an appeal to the factions to accept the ceasefire. The conference also decided to solicit the assistance of Jimmy Carter's International Negotiation Network (INN) in monitoring an election.

In July 1991, Yamoussoukro II resulted in the signing of a joint agreement with INN, broadening the organizations involved in the mediation and negotiation process. Yamoussoukro

III was also signed in September finalizing the encampment and disarmament procedures. The factions unconditionally agreed to encamp troops, disarm them and deposit their arms in armories to be guarded by ECOMOG. It was at this stage that Senegal, a member of the Committee of Five decided to contribute troops to assist in the implementation of these agreements. At Yamoussoukro IV from 28-29 October 1991, the parties further reaffirmed their acceptance of the terms of their previous agreements and set a timetable for the deployment of ECOMOG forces, the disarmament, the encampment and the elections. ECOMOG's role also included creating a buffer zone along the border with Sierra Leone to separate NPFL and ULIMO forces who at this time had resumed skirmishes. This agreement also gave ECOMOG the responsibility of securing the country to ensure that displaced persons returning home registered for the elections. These accords then became the operating principles in the ECOWAS peace initiative.³

The ULIMO faction was excluded from all these agreements since it was not party to the first agreement signed in Lome, which was the basis of all the subsequent agreements. ULIMO continuously attacked NPFL positions making the implementation of the agreements impossible, and setting the stage for an escalation of fighting. Mr. Charles Taylor accused Sierra Leone and Guinea of aiding and supporting ULIMO actions and vehemently opposed the continued inclusion of Sierra Leone in ECOMOG operations arguing, "You (Sierra Leone) cannot be at war with us (NPFL) and at the same time see yourself as a peacemaker."⁴ All attempts to get NPFL and ULIMO for peace talks proved futile and finally resulted in an ULIMO attack and overrunning of NPFL forces and positions up to the outskirts of Monrovia.

The intransigence of Taylor and ULIMO at this period frustrated efforts to implement the accords. The climax of these activities of NPFL and ULIMO was NPFL's attempt on the 15 October 1992 to capture Monrovia in "Operation Octopus." NPFL targets in this operation were ECOMOG Headquarters, the Free Port of Monrovia and the Water Plant at the White Plains.⁵

ECOMOG resisted these attacks with coordinated land, sea, and air assaults on areas under NPFL control.⁶ The Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and ULIMO found themselves involved and fighting NPFL along side ECOMOG.

This renewed violence prevented the implementation of the terms of the Yamoussoukro Agreements. The urgency to disarm all factions was emphasized when over 600 women, children and the elderly were allegedly massacred on 6 June 1993 at a refugee camp in Harbel Firestone Plantation by AFL.⁷ This massacre reinforced the need to bring about a peace arrangement, and this prompted ECOWAS Authority to return to Geneva on 10 July 1993 for re-negotiation of the agreement among the factions. Under the tripartite arrangement of the UN, OAU and ECOWAS, the Interim Government under Dr Sawyer, NPFL and ULIMO agreed to the establishment of a new transitional government representing all factions. The Geneva agreement was finally ratified in Cotonou, Benin on 25 July 1993 under the auspices of the UN, OAU and ECOWAS. This accord, which was an attempt at synthesizing the previous accords, was the most significant step in the efforts to stabilize the situation in Liberia. The articles in the accord covered ceasefire, disarmament, demobilization, elections, repatriation of refugees and general amnesty. Included in the agreement was the deployment of a UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) and an expanded peacekeeping force to include non- ECOWAS contingents from Tanzania and Uganda. To monitor any violations of the ceasefire between 1 August 1993 and the arrival of the additional peacekeepers and the main body of the UN Observers, the parties agreed to establish a Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JCMC). The JCMC comprised representatives of the three Liberian factions, ECOMOG and UNOMIL, with the UNOMIL representative as the chairperson.⁸

The implementation of the Cotonou Accord was delayed because the factions were divided as to who takes which ministry, particularly that of Defense, Justice, Foreign Affairs and

Finance. While political delays held up the accord, new factions sprung up within the period, notably the Lofa Defense Force (LDF), the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) and Nimba Redemption Council (NRC). Internal strife also sparked off violence amongst ULIMO's Krahn and Madingo tribes leading to a split of the group into ULIMO M under Alhaji Kromah and ULIMO K for Major General Roosevelt Johnson. The existence of these groups definitely raised new questions about the status of the Cotonou Accord, since they were not signatories to it, and were therefore not bound by the agreement. These developments led to the calling of yet another conference in Akosombo in Ghana on 12 September 1994, to draft a new peace accord. All the contending parties were invited to attend with ECOWAS, OAU and UN representatives as observers. This accord was for the factions to reaffirm their commitment to the Cotonou Accord with a few procedural changes.

The Akosombo Accord did not last and was eroded when elements of AFL attempted to overthrow the Transitional Government a few days after the accord was signed leading to an outbreak of violence. This disturbance of the peace necessitated another conference, and this was called in Accra, Ghana. The Accra Accord was signed on 21 December 1994. This accord called for a ceasefire effective 28 December 1994, and a governing council of five members nominated by the factions to run the country. The warlords namely Taylor, Alhaji Kromah and Roosevelt Johnson plus Chief Tamba Tailor and Oscar Quiah of Liberia National Council formed this governing council.

The Accra Accord was also disrupted in March 1996, when an attempt was made to oust the ULIMO K leader-Roosevelt Johnson from the governing council. This again led to renewed fighting amongst the factions with ECOMOG trying to regain control of the situation. Order was eventually restored with the signing of the Abuja Accord in Nigeria in August 1996. According to this accord, disarmament of the factions was to be completed by 31 January 1997, and all

factions were to be considered dissolved. Elections were slated in the agreement for May 1997, which did not come on, but eventually did in July. It further stipulated that anyone who desired to stand for the presidency and was serving on the ruling council had to resign in order to contest. For the first time, a lady- Mrs. Ruth Perry was nominated by the Heads of State of West Africa to steer the country to democratic elections and governance. It was the Abuja Accord that eventually led to the establishment of a democratic government in Liberia with Mr. Taylor as the President. A chronology of major events from 1991 is at Appendix C.

Rabie's Model and the Phase Two Initiative

The setbacks that ECOWAS experienced in the initial attempts at peacemaking in Liberia revealed the need to change their approach to mediation and negotiations. Throughout the initial period of the process in 1990, all attempts to get Mr. Charles Taylor to attend the peace conferences proved futile, because he perceived the SMC as partial. To restore confidence in the process, ECOWAS formed the Committee of Five comprising the Heads of State of La Cote D'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Guinea Bissau and Togo, with the Ivoirean head of state as the Chairman. This committee was an adjunct to the SMC and was to work within the framework of the ECOWAS Peace Plan. La Cote D'Ivoire and Burkina Faso were apparently the behind the scene supporters of Mr. Charles Taylor. The willingness on the part of the conflicting parties to negotiate, the availability of a mutually acceptable forum to conduct mediation activities and the credibility of the mediator must be recognized and respected by the parties, if third party mediation is to be effective.⁹

To further enhance the credibility of the mediation and negotiation process, ECOWAS invited the OAU and the UN as observers during these processes. With these transformations, ECOWAS combined diplomatic and military collaboration as a classic example of mediation by a coalition intermediary with all members involved in the process at one time or the other. The

expansion of the SMC to include the Committee of Five (now the committee of nine) and the involvement of the OAU and the UN, convinced Mr. Taylor that his views would be heard and listened to if he participated in the process.

Initiating the peace process or what Rabie calls the “Political Dialogue” phase describes all activities and arrangements to persuade adversaries to negotiate, prepare for negotiations, and help construct a potentially successful process to settle conflict peacefully.¹⁰ Harold Saunders adds that the process centers on bringing together in systematic dialogue, individuals from conflicting groups to probe the dynamics of their conflictual relationship, think together about obstacles to changing it, and design a sequence of interactive steps that might remove those obstacles.¹¹ Subsequent negotiations after the expansion of SMC, saw the political dialogue phase vital to effective negotiations. Before the Yamoussoukro meetings of the factions, the modalities for these conferences were worked out when President Eyadema of Togo called a series of meetings of all the parties in Lome in February and March 1991 to iron out their differences in preparation for negotiations. The Lome conferences laid the foundation for the subsequent meetings in Yamoussoukro that resulted in Yamoussoukro I – IV, which became the basis of the peace plan until elections in 1997. However, Yamoussoukro IV could not be implemented before hostilities broke out again in October 1992.

This outbreak of hostilities necessitated another round of talks to get the peace plan back on track. This process was again initiated by getting all the parties to a meeting in Geneva under the joint observation of ECOWAS, the OAU and the UN. The outcome of the discussions in Geneva was eventually ratified in Cotonou during the ECOWAS summit meeting on 25 July 1993 as the Cotonou Accord.

One important feature of these agreements as opposed to the initial peace plan worked out by the SMC in 1990 is that, ECOWAS, OAU and the UN were the third party mediators with

the parties to conflict actually discussing amongst themselves and working out a program of action. No terms of these agreements were imposed on the parties. ECOWAS and the UN witnessed the deliberations and signing of the agreements as the implementing and monitoring authority.

ECOWAS's efforts at peacemaking during the phase two were consistent with what Rabie advocates as the pre-conditions for establishing a lasting agreement. All the agreements signed during this period went through the initiation process (getting parties together to plan how to negotiate) and the negotiation phase, which resulted in mutually acceptable and workable agreements. The fact that these agreements could not be implemented immediately was not because of the unworkability of the programs, but rather because of the intransigence of some of the factions and their leaders. The ambitions of Mr. Charles Taylor of NPFL and Alhaji Kromah of ULIMO M to become President frustrated the regional efforts at implementing their own agreements.

The phase two initiative by ECOWAS to arrange the peace was more a success than its initial attempt in 1990. The expansion of the mediation coalition to include the Committee of Five with OAU and UN representation gave it credibility as a neutral third party mediator. The process systematically progressed from the initiation phase to the negotiations. The delays in the last stage of the process of peacemaking – the implementation phase, was due to the selfishness of the leaders of the factions, who were too eager to become president or to maintain the status quo.

Peacekeeping Principles and the Phase Two Initiative

Clear Objective. With the signing of the Yamoussoukro IV Accord by the factions, a clear mandate was given to ECOMOG. The accord yielded a plan with definite timetables for the deployment of the forces, the disarmament and encampment of the warring factions and elections.

In accordance with the agreement, ECOMOG was tasked to occupy all the country's air and sea ports, and the creation of a buffer along the border with Sierra Leone, to separate NPFL and ULIMO forces. ECOMOG was also to ensure the security of Liberians as they returned home to register for the elections. The accord initialed by the President of the Interim Government and all the factions, and witnessed by the ECOWAS Mediation Committee, became the operating principles in the ECOWAS peace initiative in Liberia.¹² Even though new accords were signed after Yamoussoukro IV was violated, the subsequent accords still used Yamoussoukro IV as the basis for promulgating the new ones with ECOMOG remaining as the implementing authority.

Legitimacy. Legitimacy, in principle, deals with the acceptability of the force by the factions in the conflict. Impartiality of the force was thus critical to the success of the operation. Legitimacy was enhanced when Senegal, a member of the Committee of Five and a Francophone country, opted to provide a contingent to augment the strength of the SMC countries. To further strengthen the peacekeeping force and broaden its legitimacy and impartiality, non-West African countries from Africa, notably Tanzania and Uganda provided contingents to ECOMOG. Another mark of legitimacy of the force was the United Nations Security Council Resolution 788 (1992) of 19 November 1992. It commended ECOWAS for its efforts to restore peace, security and stability in Liberia, reaffirm its belief that Yamoussoukro IV Accord offers the best possible framework for peaceful resolution of the conflict and called on the parties to respect and implement the ceasefire and various provisions of the accord. It also requested the dispatch of the Secretary General's Special Representative to Liberia.¹³ The signing of the Yamoussoukro IV Accord by all the factions which mandated ECOMOG to oversee the general security of Liberia and the implementation of the accord, meant they had consented to ECOMOG's presence.

Unity of Effort. As outlined in the mandate of the force, the tasks varied from military to humanitarian assignments. To accomplish the military tasks of securing the country, disarming

and demobilizing the combatants, the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) and ECOMOG forces were jointly deployed throughout the country to supervise and monitor the process. There was close coordination between UNOMIL, ECOMOG, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and the OAU representative. The humanitarian aspect of the mandate was taken care of by United Nations International Agencies, Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). The disarmament program involved collecting arms from combatants and issuing relief items to them for immediate sustenance to discourage them from returning to fight. The military and civil organizations therefore worked closely to implement this plan.

Security. Force protection and security of the country were the main concerns of ECOMOG. ECOMOG Command estimated that 18,000 troops was ideal for the force to effectively dominate the country and carry out its tasks. A force of such a strength could not be raised, thereby making the demobilization process difficult. The strength situation was worsened by the withdrawal of Senegal, Tanzania and Uganda because of national domestic reasons. Due to the lack of Liberia-wide security and the failure of ECOMOG's infantry companies to reach all their agreed locations, disarmament and demobilization sites were not opened in all of the areas originally proposed.¹⁴ Despite the inadequacy of the force for security, the deployment of the military facilitated the emergence of an environment safe enough for internal and external humanitarian support. In this regard, it has been argued that from the standpoint of humanitarian assistance, the intervention not only reduced the number of atrocities, but it also created the conditions under which relief agencies could more effectively carry out their operations.¹⁵

Restraint. In spite of ECOMOG's overwhelming military capability over the NPFL, and the numerous provocative actions by this faction, ECOMOG was restrained by her rules of engagement (ROE). Anytime ECOMOG conducted armed actions against NPFL, it was in self-

defense. For instance, the October 1992 attack of NPFL on ECOMOG and Monrovia in 'Operation Octopus' after almost two years of peace, saw NPFL fighters almost overrunning ECOMOG positions in Monrovia. ECOMOG was compelled into a defensive-offensive posture for over a month, and later managed to push NPFL forces out of the city. This operation enabled ECOMOG to secure strategic areas including Robertsfield International Airport, the Firestone Rubber Plantation and the port and city of Buchanan.¹⁶ ECOMOG was definitely conscious of its mission and third party role, and only ensured NPFL was out of the city to create peace in Monrovia. The pressure exerted on NPFL perhaps compelled Charles Taylor to declare a unilateral ceasefire and appealed to UN to assist in peaceful negotiations. This eventually led to the Geneva and Cotonou Accords.

Lessons Learned

The approach to the peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts during the phase two of the ECOWAS initiative differed from that of the phase one attempt, and lessons from this phase need to be examined for remedial measures to be taken.

The agreements signed during the phase two were deliberated on by the factions with ECOWAS, OAU and the UN as the mediators. Rabie believes that negotiations are shared processes that bring antagonists together to review the conflict and try to settle disputes. The fact that the factions themselves came out with the agreements, made them more acceptable to all the factions than the SMC initial agreement which was more of an imposition. In a report submitted by the Secretary General's Representative, Gordon Somers, to the Secretary General, he stated that , "all the warring factions in Liberia continued to accept the Yamoussoukro IV Accord as the most realistic basis on which a durable peace can be constructed."¹⁷

Rabie further advocates that all adversaries should be part of the negotiation process, and agreements reached should strive to integrate the interest of antagonists by creating new

frameworks and incentives to cooperation. The emergence of new factions which were not involved in the peace process always stalled it. The Yamoussoukro IV Accord was stalled because ULIMO was not a signatory to that agreement. ULIMO, therefore, attacked NPFL since the agreement was not binding on it. In the same manner, the emergence of the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) after the Cotonou Accord, also brought a new dimension into the crisis by violating the accord to attack NPFL too. These attacks gave justification for Charles Taylor to refuse to disarm and demobilize as demanded by the Cotonou Accord. Again, at the Akosombo meeting, though all the factions involved in the conflict were invited to attend and deliberate, when it came to signing the agreements, it was only the main factions--NPFL, AFL and ULIMO--that signed with the President of the Interim Government. Leaving some factions (LDF, LPC and NRC) out when it came to signing the agreement meant that the agreements were not binding on those who were not allowed to sign. ECOWAS was of the conviction that as long as the main factions signed the agreement, the ceasefire and other provisions of the agreements would always be accepted. This was, however, not the case. The springing up of these factions complicated fighting throughout the country and was a contributing factor to the stalling and prolongation of the peace process as it became difficult to disarm.

In peace operations, unity of effort emphasizes the need to direct all resources and means towards the common goal-peace. The lack of a common policy on the part of ECOWAS countries to the peace process contributed to its long duration. Most of the countries involved in the coalition had divergent interests and changing agenda in the process. Nigeria was perceived by other member countries particularly the francophone countries, as exploiting the organizational authority in the process to legitimize its ambitions for sub-regional dominance. Burkina Faso and La Cote D'Ivoire continually allowed weapons to transit across their borders into the rebel hands due to personal loyalties while providing verbal support to the ECOWAS

peace plan.¹⁸ Sierra Leone and Guinea provided support and encouragement to ULIMO to become another warring faction by allowing their countries to be used as training bases. In 1993, Baffour Ankomah, editor of Africa News Magazine, perceived ECOMOG as a regional failure due to the hidden agenda of ECOMOG sponsors, and blamed the prolongation of the war on ECOMOG.¹⁹ In effect, it means ECOWAS member countries were not committed to the ideals of peace, stability, and progress that ECOMOG was pursuing.

Security, apart from its force protection phenomena, also requires a physical domination of the theater with protective measures against any hostile groups or activities. Lack of funds and resources was a barrier to the ability of ECOWAS and OAU to raise the required forces to police the whole of Liberia for the disarmament and demobilization process. ECOMOG was optimistic that the demobilization process would work but needed 18,000 troops to implement it. Zimbabwe, had promised a contingent, but could not honor it because of lack of funds. Tanzania and Uganda, that had provided a contingent each, were withdrawn because they lacked the resources and funds to continue to support the process. The result was a lack of nation-wide security and failure to get troops into all the agreed disarmament and demobilization sites. The UN Special Representative blamed the delay in the demobilization on insufficient security measures throughout the country to assist persons returning home.²⁰

The agreements reached during the phase-two peace process had better chances of passing the feasibility, acceptability and suitability tests. The agreements stressed the need to disarm and demobilize before embarking on organizing any democratic elections, which was left out in the initial SMC imposed agreement of 1990. The strength of the force was increased and the area of operation expanded to cover most of the country. It was also more acceptable to the factions involved because it was the outcome of their own deliberations. The Abuja Accord, like

most of the accords signed during the phase II, addressed the root causes of the problem , and was therefore suitable.

¹Committee of Five was made up of the Presidents of La Cote D'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Togo, Senegal, and Guinea Bissau.

²Linda K Knight, (1995, April) "Can there be Peace in Liberia?" Unpublished paper.

³Clement Abide, United Nations Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Liberia (New York: United Nations Publications, 1996), 41.

⁴Patrick Smith, ed, "Liberia: Another Bend in the Road," Africa Continental 33, no 11 (5 June 1992): 5.

⁵Linda K. Knight, 86.

⁶Ibid., 93.

⁷Ibid., 95.

⁸M. Weller, Regional Peacekeeping and International Enforcement: The Liberian Crisis (Cambridge: Grotius Publication, 1994), 341.

⁹Rabie Mohammed, Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1994), 91.

¹⁰Ibid., 87.

¹¹Harold Saunders, "We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation," Negotiation Journal (1985): 2.

¹²Adibe, 42.

¹³Weller, 274.

¹⁴John MacKinlay and Abiodun Alao, Liberia 1994: ECOMOG and UNOMIL Responses to a Complex Emergency (New York: United Nations University, Occasional Paper No 1, 1994), 35.

¹⁵Ofuatey-Kodjoe, Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflicts : The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia, paper presented at a workshop on Multinational Organizations and the Amelioration of Ethnic Conflicts, held at the Ralph Bunche Institute on the United Nations, City University of New York, NY, 14 May 1993), 33.

¹⁶Ibid., 23.

¹⁷Akyaba Addai-Sebo, "UN Level Playing Field," Africa Events, 9, no 4 (April 1993): 27.

¹⁸Linda K Knight, 124.

¹⁹Baffour Ankomah, "Liberia-Is ECOMOG a Model for Africa?" Speech presented at the School of African Studies in London, England on 28 September 1993 as part of the Royal African Society's Autumn 1993 Series. He was the Editor of New Africa Magazine.

²⁰Cindy Shiner, "The Authority Vacuum," Africa Report 3, no 6 (November/December 1994): 24.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

The Charter of the OAU maintains that conditions of peace and security constitute the cornerstone on which African solidarity and cooperation can be built. The founding fathers of the OAU created the Commission for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration as one of the four principal institutions of the organization to underscore its commitment to peaceful settlements of regional conflicts. This commission from its inception was functionally inactive, and cannot take credit for resolving any conflict on the continent. The abysmal performance of the commission and the continuous resurgence of conflicts has necessitated the renewed interest in Africa for the need to approach the issue of conflict resolution more pragmatically. This growing determination to solve her conflicts led to the approval for the setting up of an African mechanism for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts on the continent. The case studies on Chad and Liberia provide lessons that serve as the basis of this analysis to answer the primary question of what processes and approaches Africa should adopt for a more responsive and effective resolution of her conflicts.

Democracy and Peace. Before attention is focused on the lessons from the shortcomings in these case studies, a look at the causes of these conflicts could provide an antidote to some of the problems in Africa. In the Chadian conflict, the dictatorship and undemocratic tendencies of Francois Tombalbaye's regime, coupled with ethnicity divided the country into northern and southern factions. This subsequently led to the formation of FROLINAT which started the northern insurgency. Even when Tombalbaye was ousted from power and the northerners (Goukouni and Habre) came to power, there was still division amongst them because of the political ambitions of these leaders. The Liberian case was no different. President Doe's human rights record was poor and his desire to clench to power through unfair rigging of elections threw

his country into turmoil which devastated the country beyond immediate recovery and rehabilitation.

There are many continuing situations of instability on the continent, and if current trends prevail, prospects seem bleak.¹ In Guinea Bissau, opposition to the current government is becoming more militant. In Nigeria, an increasingly vociferous opposition (though brutally suppressed) is trying to organize international sanctions against a seemingly interminable military regime. Genocide and civil war in Burundi remain equally an unlimited prospect. Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), has not stabilized after the Kabilia takeover to the extent where peace prevails. Current political infighting creates the potential for possible further upheaval in this war-ravaged country. In Sierra Leone the civil war continues.² As Sam Amoo describes, "the current spate of African conflicts is precipitated by a crisis of political legitimacy in the African state and by the need to manage change and provide transition to stable states with responsible and legitimate governments."³ Rabie, in assessing various approaches to conflict resolutions, stated that, despite the shortcomings of democracy in several countries, it remains largely superior to all other political systems, particularly with regard to human rights, accountability, economic efficiency, and ability to mitigate power struggles and avoid civil wars.⁴

The OAU is the highest political conglomeration of heads of state on the continent and should be able to sound a unified and strong voice against any member violating democratic and human right principles. The emerging political era in Africa challenges the OAU and other sub-regional organizations to redefine their operational principles and draw a new set of principles for inter African relations and the management of conflicts.⁵ For instance, the notion of sovereignty, non-interference and territorial integrity of states should be re-examined at considering the changing nature of African society. One problem for the OAU in this era, is how to respond to the challenges to the status quo of member states. The OAU came close to getting to grips with

this new reality when it condemned the execution of Ogoni Minority Rights leader, Ken Saro Wiwa, by the Abacha regime in Nigeria in October 1995. The organization can go further than just verbal condemnation of members to the severing of diplomatic relations and calling for the imposition of sanctions on recalcitrant members.

The notion that ethnicity is the cause of most conflicts in Africa cannot be concretely substantiated. The claim of ethnicity as the cause of conflicts is mostly used as a pretext by politically ambitious citizens to mass support in order to execute and perpetrate their selfish dreams of grabbing power.

Table 1 – Mediation/Negotiation Matrix on Studies

	Initiation	Negotiation	Implementation
Chad	2	1	1
Liberia I	2	1	1
Liberia II	2	2	2

Rating: 1 – Low, 2 – Medium, 3 – High.

The mediation/negotiation matrix above is a summary of rating observations on the negotiation processes conducted in the cases studies. The values assigned indicate the rating of each of the phases of the mediation and negotiation processes. From the matrix, it is evident that the negotiation and implementation phases of the Chad and Liberia I were not satisfactorily carried out. In the Chadian crisis, Nigeria unilaterally initiated the process which was later supported by the OAU and the membership increased to include other African countries. In Liberia, it was again initiated by Nigeria, which got the support of other members of ECOWAS and eventually OAU's attention. In all these cases, the processes were started when the conflicts had reached the manifest level (crisis). At the OAU and sub-regional bodies level, the use of ad hoc committees has been the primary instrument of conflict management and resolution. These

ad hoc committees have not been operationally ideal for intensive and consistent third party mediations. They end up being accused of partiality and hidden agendas, and ineffective because they lack an in-depth knowledge of the root causes of the problem.

African diplomacy has been characterized by mediation emanating from geographically proximate countries to the conflict ridden country. However, neighborly interest does not necessarily translate into capacity for effective mediation.⁶ The organizational effectiveness of the OAU in conflict management and resolution can be enhanced if the organization really takes up an active leadership role in all peacemaking efforts. The search for solutions should not only be focused on the organization. It should also focus on the individual states and their leaders, and on what mediation processes would be culturally and politically acceptable.⁷ Whether the mediation is to be undertaken by an individual state leader or a coalition of state leaders, it is important that such a decision is ratified by the Assembly of Heads of State. Personalities to be nominated for such assignments should be knowledgeable and reputable Africans, statesmen or distinguished personalities with reasonably unquestionable credibility and neutrality. These nominations could be from sub-regional bodies, but the approval and appointment should be the role of the OAU Secretariat in consultation with the parties in conflict. During the Rwandan conflict in the early 1990s, for example, President Mwinyi of Tanzania was able to get the parties in the conflict to the negotiation table on the authority of the OAU. He was able to arrange the Arusha Peace Accord in 1993 between Rwanda Government and the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). The success in getting the parties together was because the disputants in the conflict had trust and confidence in his neutrality and impartiality.⁸ Earlier to this success is the case of the Nigerian civil war in 1967, when the traditional mode of conflict management was executed successfully. General Gowon, representing the Nigerian Government and Colonel Ojukwu, the leader of the breakaway Biafran state agreed to meet in Aburi, Ghana, under the mediatory role of

General Joseph Ankrah, then Ghana's Head of State. The disputants had known the Ghanaian leader earlier during their formative years as cadets in the Ghana Military Academy. The respect the disputants had for their elderly common friend (General Ankrah) facilitated the fruitful negotiations that led to agreements which ended the Nigerian civil war. This goes to confirm the role individuals can play in mediation and negotiation. The bottom line of mediation is the credibility and neutrality of the third party.

The OAU and the sub-regional bodies lack the resources for effective mediation. Successful conflict management required extensive outlay of deployable resources and a high level of expertise in complex fields: organization of conferences, referenda, elections; targeted to the avoidance or reduction of conflicts through socio-economic programs.⁹ The lack of resources in these areas weakens the mediation and negotiation ability of the OAU and sub-regional bodies as well as their credibility in the eyes of conflict parties. Major powers like the United States have been successful in conflict mediation because they have the means to entice combatants to agree to peace either by promising reward or threatening sanctions. In tackling African mediation issues, the OAU may have to adopt a multilateral approach to such conflicts; where the OAU will complement the role of the United Nations. This approach, for the mean time, will take advantage of the resources of the OAU as a mediator, while employing other powers and agencies like the UN and NGO's to supply other mediatory resources such as leverage, moral authority, creditability, legitimacy and physical resources.¹⁰

Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy. To further circumvent the lack of finances and resources associated with resolving conflict that have reached a crisis state, Africa should intensify her efforts towards preventing conflicts from reaching these levels. As outlined by Rabie in the step by step approach to conflict resolution, early warning and preventive diplomacy will reduce the level of violence and change the dynamics of the conflict. Early warning and

preventive diplomacy seek realistic arrangements to contain and eliminate some of the symptoms and causes. This means that early warring mechanisms will have to be set in place to monitor all “hotspots.” In Chad, after independence, when the President, Francois Tombalbaye, started arresting his political rivals particularly from the north, and subsequently declaring a one party state, it should have sounded alarm bells to concerned Africans that the country was heading for confusion. The forming of FROLINAT in 1966 as an armed organization against the N'Djamena government was a clear signal of what was to follow. In Liberia, the situation was no different as President Doe’s dictatorship and poor human rights record had led to many Liberians fleeing their country. In this case again the rest of Africa and the world watched unperturbed as President Doe unleashed terror on his countrymen. Africa’s attention was drawn to these cases when civil war broke out in both cases in 1979 and 1989.

Circumstances that give rise to violent conflicts can usually be foreseen as indicated above. What is needed in early warning is not simply more information, but rather the right kind of information and reliable interpretation of the meaning. A list of indicators of impending crisis situations is at Appendix D. Governments, international organizations, NGOs, business enterprises, religious leaders, the media and even the public at large all have in different ways, a capability for early warning. NGOs are often the first to be aware of and act in crisis areas, and they have a wealth of information regarding the conditions and grievances that give rise to violence.¹¹ There are no mechanisms in Africa for governments or decision-makers of the major regional organizations to acquire systematically, the information that these agencies and NGOs normally have. There is therefore the need for African governments and the regional organizations to put in place systematic and practical warning systems combined with consistently updated contingency plans for preventive actions. Conflict prevention consists not only of avoiding escalation of violence in a crisis, but also of creating a durable basis for peace

alternatives. No single institute or government in Africa, no matter how powerful can do it alone. Efforts have to be made through bilateral, multilateral and unofficial channels to pressure, cajole, arbitrate, mediate or lend good offices to encourage dialogue and facilitate a non-violent resolution of crisis in its early stages.¹²

Table 2 - Peacekeeping Principle's Matrix

	Clear Objective	Legitimacy	Unity of Effort	Security	Restraint
Chad	1	2	1	1	1
Liberia I	1	2	2	1	1
Liberia II	2	3	3	2	2

Rating : 1 – Low, 2 – Medium, 3 - High

From the studies conducted on the above conflict situations, the Liberians peace process from 1991 scored higher points for operating in line with the principles of peace operations.

Due to the inappropriate manner in which the mediation and negotiations were conducted in the Chad and Liberia I situations, the mandates arrived at for these operations were ambiguous. In the Chadian case, the ambiguity led to different interpretation of the mandate by the OAU force and the host government. In Liberia I, it was not clear whether the mandate had a peacekeeping or a peace enforcement objective. In peace operations the strategic political objective and end state should always be clearly stated to give military commanders the opportunity to formulate their operational objectives for the accomplishment of the overall mission. Closely linked to the lack of clear objectives was the lack of diplomatic and political advisers to the Force Commanders in these operations. The absence of such key personalities to give the needed political direction, left the military commanders unguided in the operations which needed diplomatic solutions. The OAU and the sub-regional organizations should set up viable

institutions staffed with career diplomats and military experts to work out acceptable mandates that should meet the political objectives of the organizations. It should also be appropriate for field commanders to be provided advisory staff in the field of political, legal, press and information affairs, to assist commanders interpret issues pertaining to these important professional fields.

Legitimacy is derived from the mandate authorizing the operation, the impartiality of the peacekeepers and the sponsoring states or organization and consent of the factions in conflict. In Chad, legitimacy was lost when the government (GUNT) accused the OAU force of supporting and assisting the forces of Hussian Habre. In Liberia, the NPFL of Mr. Taylor never consented to the deployment of ECOMOG, because it was perceived to be an impartial force mainly from anglophone countries of West Africa. The mentioned elements of legitimacy should therefore be the focus of operational conduct of any African peacekeeping force, and should be stressed in doctrine. Loss of legitimacy and credibility as a trustworthy third party prejudices security (force protection) and eventually leads to loss of control.

A vital mechanism for effectively managing peace operations is the structure of its command and control. The OAU force for Chad had failed to establish a well defined and operative command system which left it ineffective. Various contingents in Chad received and carried out instructions from their home governments instead of the commander in the theater. In Liberia, there was not much interference with the command from home governments, but the lack of central logistics under the commander of the force, also weakened his overall control over the forces. In peace operations doctrine demands unity of effort under a Unified Command in all aspects of the operations. It is expedient that all contingents report to the executive orders from one well defined commander in the field.¹³ This will prevent every contingent from pursuing a

hidden agenda, which might derail the force from achieving its mandated mission. Unified Command and Control should be both in the political as well as the military fields.

Another aspect of unity of effort, very necessary for stabilizing refugee related problems is the cooperation of the military and civil organizations in the theater. Humanitarian assistance is usually needed to help noncombatant victims of the crisis, and such assistance must be carried out in close coordination with other political, military and economic programs. In Chad, this coordination was lacking. In Liberia, however, there was some amount of coordination between the military and civil organizations. The operations of ECOMOG made it possible for humanitarian agencies, such as the United Nations World Food Program to distribute 14,000 tons of food through the Catholic Relief Services.¹⁴ However, the efforts by some NGOs to provide cross border aid to NPFL areas through La Cote D'Ivoire, despite UNOMIL and ECOMOG directives to the contrary, created mistrust and sour relations with ECOMOG and UNOMIL.¹⁵ The organizational structure for any African peace force should include a civil-military operations center, to coordinate this important function of humanitarian assistance at all levels and harmonize relations between the military and the civil agencies.

The varying standards of expertise and performance among African countries in peace operations is also a hindrance to achieving interoperability and unity of effort. The OAU force for Chad was made up of Anglophone and Francophone countries with different doctrines and equipment. In Liberia, it was equally not different as each contingent interpreted orders to suit its national doctrine and training. The demanding environment which troops on peace operations face requires a comprehensive doctrine and effective training practices to prepare forces as best as possible for the ill-defined challenges that they meet. It becomes worse when such forces are a coalition. To ensure a uniformity of operations (interoperability) and enhance the effectiveness of the Unified Command Systems, the OAU and sub-regional forces should train and practice on a

common training doctrine and equipment. This can be achieved if at the OAU level, military experts are selected from sub-regions to collectively work out a doctrine and training package in line with UN doctrine for African forces operations in Africa. Such a package exported to all the sub-regions could serve as the primary reference material for peace operations within the individual countries. Collective coalition training could also be organized from time to time between countries within a sub-region to assess their abilities to operate effectively together.

The current African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) pioneered by the United States is perhaps a lead to the solution of interoperability of African forces in peace operations. In line with the spirit of the initiative, the US will train, equip and fund selected African countries as quick reaction forces for deployment in African conflict afflicted areas. It will be easier through the ACRI in future to deploy on short notice an African peacekeeping force capable of operating on the same doctrine based on UN peacekeeping reforms and procedures.

In as much as the ACRI is a laudable idea capable of solving some of the problems of interoperability and lack of equipment for African forces, the initiative could be double-edged if it is channeled through the OAU. Channeling the initiative through the OAU would enhance the image and capacity of the organization in the mobilization, training and resourcing of such a force. Being organized by the U.S for selected countries might raise criticisms that the U.S is establishing a military foot in Africa's door.¹⁶ As Mark Malan of the South African Institute for Security Studies put it, "Perhaps the greatest flaw in the whole ACRI concept is the failure to establish a credible linkage between capacity-buildup and capability utilization."¹⁷ In the event of a crisis, on whose mandate will such a force operate? The OAU or sub-regional groups as the authorizing body with a UN resolution legitimizing the force should be very appropriate. The ACRI program could be coordinated through the OAU, with the U.S monitoring the implementation and training.

As mentioned earlier, the lack of central logistics in African peace initiatives contributes negatively to unity of effort and command. It is a vital requirement which was under-estimated or ignored in both Chad and Liberia. In operations of this nature it should be possible for the authorizing sponsor to provide centralized logistics like vehicles, radios for communication, engineering stores and maintenance parts and services. The OAU, in a concerted effort to surmount such issues, could task each sub-regional body to initially procure a standardized and compatible version of equipment for a battalion-group size unit, to be pre-positioned strategically within the sub-region for both training and quick deployment. In the event of a crisis in any particular sub-region, the equipment and personnel of the affected region should be deployed immediately, while awaiting reinforcement of personnel and equipment from other sub-regions. Also as a commitment, it should be a standing procedure that any country submitting her forces for such tasks should be self-sufficient in basic equipment and stores like food, water, camp beds, arms and ammunitions, petroleum products, and medical stores to sustain the force for the first thirty days. Unless member countries have the political will to get involved in this effort, and consciously commit scarce resources to support such a venture, Africa will continue to rely solely on external support which might not always be forthcoming. External support in fact should be complementary to an African effort.

The low rating of the Chad and Liberian operations in their ability to maintain security as a principle again boils down to the inability of member countries to finance their forces for these operations. In Chad many countries were willing to contribute troops but could not finance the effort on their own. In the end, the countries that took part; namely Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire received external assistance before they moved in. The strength of the force that went into Chad was thus, inadequate to protect itself, let alone providing security for the whole country. In Liberia, even though the strength of that force was almost twelve thousand troops, it could not

also provide the necessary security arrangements conducive for disarmament. The reasons for the shortage of troops in Liberia again was attributed to lack of finances. Zimbabwe which promised troops failed to provide them in the end because of lack of finances and resources. Tanzania and Uganda deployed troops but had to pull them out when they were not getting external support to sustain their forces. Another African example of failure to provide sufficient troops for security due to finances difficulties, though outside this study, was in Rwanda. By May 10, 1994, the OAU Secretary-General had obtained troop contribution commitments for Rwanda from eleven African states, but after four months none had arrived for lack of resources.¹⁸ To enhance Africa's capability to provide the required strength of forces for peace operations, each sub-region should be able to raise its own task force as part of a bigger OAU coalition, depending on resources and equipment as discussed earlier. Such stand by forces, with the necessary pre-deployment training should provide solutions to Africa's problem of raising the required forces at the right time.

Applying the appropriate military capability of a force prudently is an essential element of restraint in peace operations. In Liberia, ECOMOG failed to exercise maximum restraint even though its use of force was always in self-defense. The use of naval gun fire and close air support, including artillery in support of its military actions must have been excessive of its Rules of Engagement (ROE). The result of such unrestraint use of force was the loss of credibility and the impartial status in the eyes of the NPFL. The OAU force in Chad, on the other hand, was too restrained which led to its loss of control of the situation resulting in Habre's forces literally walking through the force area of operations to take the capital-N'Djamena. For the soldier, rules of engagement are the framework that guides them in the use of force and for the commanders, they are the tools to control the use of force.¹⁹ In peace operations, emphasis is placed more on the diplomatic and political efforts with the military power assisting to achieve the diplomatic or

political goal. Unless the military effort is properly controlled, it can always pull a negative effect on the overall effort at peace. When drafting rules of engagement, commanders should ensure that they are consistent with other rules such as military law, laws of the host country, Geneva Conventions and the culture of the people in that environment, and that soldiers know that they take precedence over all other rules governing the use of force.

Conclusions

The Chad and Liberian conflict situations indicate how inadequate planning and follow-on execution can adversely affect operations no matter how well-intentioned they are. In evaluating strategic objectives of the organizations as stipulated in the mandates, the Chadian operation was a total failure. The ECOWAS operation on the other hand succeeded after seven years of upheaval. The difficulties encountered in these operations were in both the peacemaking (mediation and negotiation phases) and peacekeeping efforts.

In the field of peacemaking, no institutional organs and procedures are in place to be followed as conflicts develop. This led to the use of ad hoc bodies which lacked the knowledge of basic tenets and procedures of mediation and negotiations. In both cases of Chad and Liberia, the mediation teams were seen by some disputants to be partial and did not serve favorably as credible third party mediators. The result was that, coming to agreement with the factions was always delayed or when signed was violated with impunity. In Chad, more than seven accords were signed and none was successfully implemented. In Liberia, as many as twelve were signed before elections were finally held. In appointing membership to mediation committees, consideration should be given to how knowledgeable personalities are in the conflict situation they are to deal with, and more importantly, the perceived neutrality and credibility of members in the eyes of the factions. The traditional method of using Heads of States or governments to mediate and negotiate is not out of place, as long as their perceived neutrality and credibility can

be guaranteed. The role played by President Mwinyi of Tanzania in arranging the Arusha Peace Agreement in 1993 continues to be a shining example of this tradition fashion. To further enhance the credibility of the mediation and negotiations, OAU as the authorizing body should request a UN Special Envoy as the UN representative or observer throughout periods of mediation. It is when agreements are properly negotiated that clear mandates and objectives can be curved out.

Africa may have to place greater emphasis on early warning systems to be able to know and act early to prevent conflicts from reaching the crisis stage. Negotiations for peaceful settlements becomes difficult when fighting breaks out and various factions have made military gains. The task of the peacemaker is to grasp the root causes adequately and deal with the problem in its early stages. Preventive diplomacy is particularly important for Africa because, OAU and sub-regional organizations lack the finances, resources and material to take on large scale military operations to stabilize conflict situations. It is also important to ensure all parties to a conflict and the external financial backers of the factions are involved in the peace process to get them committed to the agreements.

In the field of peacekeeping, the violation of the principles of clear objective, legitimacy, unity of effort, security and restraint was a recipe for failure. It must be realized that though peacekeeping operations are militarily oriented, the strategic objective is normally achieved through political and diplomatic means. The military actions are geared towards assisting a political approach to the problem. The military or total approach to resolving conflicts can never be sustained, as was the case of Liberia I. All peacekeeping operations to be authorized by OAU or sub-regional bodies should ensure the military command is subordinated to a Political Envoy in theater. If these principles are religiously pursued, the operation will not be too far from success.

Peacekeeping like any military operation, requires adequate logistic backing, and in the case of large coalition operations, a centralize logistic backing will always be ideal. This was a sour point for these African operations. It is true that African countries are poor and lack the resources for such operations, however, if African leaders are really committed to the ideals of conflict resolution and management, it will not be impossible to pool resources together for such operations. No matter how laudable and adequately prepared the plans are for peace operations, the lack of funds and logistics will make execution impossible. Africa has to make the effort at raising her own funds for her plans at conflict resolution before the international community and friendly industrial countries can come to her aid. The conflict resolution mechanism cannot be managed with anticipated funds and aid.

Preventive diplomacy continues to be the most promising approach to conflict resolution in Africa if pursued sincerely. The cost involved in human lives and material losses, and the lack of resources of African states to contain conflicts in the manifest stage, demands that preventive measures be considered seriously. Rampant human rights abuses resulting from undemocratic practices have often been the prelude to most violent situations on the continent. Effective participatory government based on the rule of law reduces the chances of citizens taking matters into their own hands and resolving their differences through violence. The UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan described transition to democracy in Africa as the "Third Wave" of lasting peace.²⁰ Leaders, governments and organizations in Africa closest to potentially violent situations have the primary responsibility for taking preventive action. This can be started by calling for responsive governments, protection of human rights and the promotion of social and economic well-being in Africa, which are mostly the root causes of the conflicts.

The need for a Rapid Deployable Force, well organized, trained and equipped, ready to be deployed at short notice is necessary when preventive diplomacy fails, or when conflict breaks

out without warning signals. The current defense protocols in the sub regions should be encouraged and the rapidly deployable forces built around them with the OAU centrally coordinating their deployment. As suggested by General Erskine, "African governments should enshrine in their national constitutions, the provisions that allow troops to be made available to support the OAU and other sub regional organizations, when requested to maintain peace and security."²¹ Of course, the assistance of the UN and other friendly industrial countries through the OAU in providing some equipment, funds and the necessary training and monitoring can make such a project viable. Any unilateral external assistance to individual African states without coordinating with the OAU or the sub regional bodies might be counter productive to the objective of rapid deployment.

The experiences in Liberia and the role played by President Mwinyi of Tanzania during the Arusha Peace Agreement in 1993, indicate that Africa has the capacity to make the conflict resolution and management mechanism workable. President Mwinyi's success in arranging the Arusha agreement was because the procedures and principles adopted were in line with Rabie's model of mediation and negotiations. The phase two of the Liberian operation also followed Rabie's model as well as the principles of peace support operations. African leaders and governments need the political will to pool their resources together to collectively tackle the problem of conflict resolution and general peace and stability on the continent. The weaknesses of OAU and the sub regional bodies can be attenuated by collaborating with external powers and organizations and their strength accentuated to make them credible organizations.²²

¹John P. T. Brooks, "A Military Model for Conflict Resolution in Sub-Saharan Africa," in Parameters (US Army War College Quarterly), xxvii, no. 4 (Winter 1997-98): 111.

²Africa Confidential, 19 January 1996, 3.

³Sam G. Amoo, "Role of the OAU: Past, Present, Future" in David R. Smock ed., Making War and Waging Peace (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1993), 254.

⁴Rabie Mohammed, Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1988), 76.

⁵Agyeman-Duah, "The Role of the OAU" in Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Changes in International Politics and Implication for Peace in Africa (Accra: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 1996), 92.

⁶David R. Smock, Creative Approaches to Managing Conflicts in Africa, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), 4.

⁷Amoo, 250.

⁸Smock, 4.

⁹On the International Organizations inter-related functions of Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace Servicing, see David P. Forsythe, United Nations Peacemaking (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), 1-3.

¹⁰Amoo, 255.

¹¹Final Report of Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, December 1997, 46.

¹²Ibid., 48.

¹³Lieutenant General EA Erskine, "Overview on Peacekeeping and Peacemaking Initiatives," in Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Changes in International Politics and Implication for Peace in Africa (Accra: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 1996), 56.

¹⁴Ofuatey-Kodjoe, "Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflicts: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia," paper presented at a workshop on Multilateral Organizations and the Amelioration of Ethnic Conflicts, held at the Ralph Bunche Institute on the United Nations, City University of New York City, 14 May 1993, 30-31.

¹⁵See presentation by Anthony D. Marley, Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen: International Intervention in Liberia, at 1996 Meeting of the African Studies Association, San Francisco, CA, 13.

¹⁶Dan Henk and Steven Metz, The United States and the Transformation of African Security: The African Crisis Response Initiative and Beyond (Washington, DC: US Army War College, 1997), 35.

¹⁷Mark Malan, "US Response to Africa Crisis: An Overview and Preliminary Analysis of the ACRI," Institute for Security Studies Papers, No. 24, August 1997, 5.

¹⁸William Zartman, “Guidelines for Preserving Peace in Africa” in African Conflict Resolution: The US Role in Peacemaking, edited by David R. Smock and Chester A. Crocker (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 98.

¹⁹US Army Command and General Staff College, A743-5, Operational Law for Commanders: Advance Book (Fort Leavenworth: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1997), 185.

²⁰Final Report of Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 94.

²¹Lieutenant General EA Erskine, 79.

²²Amoo, 257.

APPENDIX A
CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS--CHAD, 1979-82

DATE	EVENT
28 November 1958	Chad Becomes a Republic
11 August 1960	Chad becomes independent
September 1963	Arrest of several Northern Politicians
4 June 1964	One-Party State declared
June 1966	FROLINAT formed
April 1974	President Tombalbaye killed in a coup d'etat; General Malloum takes over as President of Supreme Military Council (CSM)
May 1976	Habre broke away with section of Second Army of FROLINAT to form Forces Armees du Nord (FAN)
September 1977	Habre's FAN and General Malloum CSM sign Accord for power sharing.
29 August 1978	Malloum and Habre begin power sharing government
March 1979	Civil war in N'Djaneena between Habre and Malloum forces.
10-14 March 1979	Nigerian mediation begins(Kano I). Nigerian unilateral peacekeeping force sent to N'Djameena
29 April 1979	First Government of National Unity (GUNT) formed, led by Lol Choua
18 August 1979	Lagos II Accord signed(GUNT II Agreement)
10 November 1979	New GUNT formed, led by Gonkouni with Habre as Defense Minister
21 March 1980	Civil War in N'Djamena between Goukouni and Habre forces
13 December 1980	Libyan armed intervention in support of Goukouni forces. Habre defeated with Libyan assistance and forced into exile.
6 January 1981	Unification of Chad with Libya announced.
June 1981	OAU Pan African Force Mandate signed
3 November 1981	Libyan troops withdrawn: OAU peacekeeping force takes over.
7 June 1982	Habre's forces retake N'Djamena; Goukouni flees.
24 June 1982	OAU forces ends mission and withdraw.

Source: Sam C. Nolushungu, *Limits of Anarchy - Intervention and State Formation in Chad* (Charlottesville and Landon: University Press of Virginia, 1996), xi.

APPENDIX B
CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS--LIBERIA, 1990-91

Date	Event
30 May 1990	ECOWAS Authority meeting in Banjul, the Gambia, calls for an end to hostility, and establishes a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) with a mandate to deal with the Liberian crisis.
7 August 1990	The first Summit of the SMC adopts a peace plan for Liberia. The Plan includes the establishment of an Interim Government of National Unity in Liberia (IGNU) and an ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to implement the peace plan.
24 August 1990	ECOMOG troops drawn from Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone arrive in Monrovia from Freetown under the command of Lt. Gen. Arnold Quainoo of Ghana.
27-31 August 1990	A conference of Liberian political parties, interest groups and concerned citizens meeting in Banjul under the auspices of ECOWAS, elects Prof. Amos Sawyer to head an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU).
9 September 1990	President Doe is captured by rebel leader Prince Yormie Johnson while on a visit to ECOMOG headquarters. Doe dies 24 hours later of torture in Johnson's captivity.
24 September 1990	Charles Taylor installs himself as president of Liberia in his command headquarters in Gbarnnga. Three days later, Major General Joshua Dogonyaro of Nigeria arrives in Monrovia to assume command of ECOMOG "field operations," thereby relieving Ghana's General Quainoo of his command. With a reinforcement of 1200 troops and material, ECOMOG goes on the offensive against NPFL.
24 October 1990	Lt. General Hezekiah Bowen, head of the remnants of Doe's Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), Charles Taylor's NPFL and Johnson's INPFL, represented by Dr. Peter Naigow, sign the first of several cease-fire agreements.
21 November 1990	Dr. Amos Sawyer, head of IGNU, arrives in Monrovia to assume responsibilities of state. At a swearing-in ceremony in the office of Gen. Dogonyaro, ECOMOG Field Commander, Prince Johnson and AFL pledge their allegiance to the new government, while an embittered Taylor refuses to recognize IGNU and vows to fight on. Sawyer's "inauguration" ceremony was attended by diplomats from the USA, Britain, Nigeria and Egypt, thus implying their countries' <i>de facto</i> recognition of the new government.
28 November 1990	Charles Taylor, Noah Bordolo, Sr. and Col. Wilmot Diggs, representing the NPFL, INPFL and AFL respectively sign yet another cease-fire agreement in Bamako. Taylor's assent to the agreement comes as a result of pressures mounted on him by his backers, notably Libya's Muammar Quadaffi who had been consulted for support on Nov. 19 by a high-powered ECOWAS delegation.

21 December 1990	Under the auspices of ECOWAS, the NPFL represented by Tom Woewiyu, INPFL by Peter Naigow, and AFL by Lt. Gen. J.H. Bowen sign a joint statement in Banjul, in which they agree to hold an All-Liberia Conference within sixty days, and work out modalities for monitoring and implementing the cease-fire.
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Source: Adapted from Clement Adibe, Managing Arms in Peace Process: Liberia (New York: United Nations Publications, 1996), 51-55.

APPENDIX C

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS--LIBERIA, 1991-97

13 February 1991	Another cease-fire between the warring factions is signed in Lomé, Togo. The parties agree to hold a national conference by mid-March which would, among other things, decide on the composition of a new transitional government.
1 March 1991	At the invitation of President Gnassingbe Eyadema, Dr. Amos Sawyer, representing IGNU, Charles Taylor of NPFL and Prince Yormie Johnson meet to discuss the crisis. They agree to work towards a national conference by mid-month and to "refrain from taking any action that might be prejudicial to the arrangements being made." By mid-March the national conference is held, with the notable abstention of Charles Taylor, and Amos Sawyer is re-elected President of IGNU.
30 June 1991	In the first of several efforts, President Houphouet-Boigny brings the warring factions under the auspices of the Committee of Five to find a solution to the conflict. The agreement reached becomes known as Yamoussoukro I.
29 July 1991	Yamoussoukro II is signed; it is the product of ECOWAS working jointly with Jimmy Carter's International Negotiation Network (INN).
17 September 1991	Yamoussoukro III is signed amidst great expectation.
30 October 1991	Yamoussoukro IV is signed amidst the escalation of ECOMOG offensive. Present at the formal ceremonies were OAU Sec.-Gen., Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, and Mrs. Dayle Spencer of INN. The agreement stipulates that the ECOMOG mission "cover the whole of Liberia," and that all warring factions be encamped and disarmed within sixty days. Senegal agrees to contribute troops to ECOMOG.
7 April 1992	ECOWAS Committee of Five meeting at Houphouet-Boigny's winter home in Geneva reaffirms Yamoussoukro IV, and directs "the Field Commander of ECOMOG to implement the Yamoussoukro Accord without any further delay."
15 October 1992	Charles Taylor launches a major offensive against ECOMOG forces in a bid to take over Monrovia. ECOMOG responds with an air, land, and sea-launched counter-offensive against NPFL territories well into the hinterland.
19 October 1992	A joint session of the SMC and the Committee of Five takes place in Cotonou, Benin Republic. Taylor's assault is reviewed, and the meeting calls for an economic embargo on the NPFL effective November 5 if it fails to disarm. <u>ECOWAS invites the UN to assist in implementing the peace plan.</u>
November 1992	The UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 788 which endorses the ECOWAS Peace Plan, condemns Taylor's attack on ECOMOG troops and imposes an arms embargo on the NPFL. Trevor Gordon Sommers is appointed Special Representative of the Sec.-Gen. Of the UN in Liberia.

January 1993	Senegal pulls out of ECOMOG, ostensibly for reasons of domestic politics. ECOMOG forces, reinforced by 5,000 Nigerian and Ghanaian troops, strength swells to 16,000.
4 April 1993	ECOMOG captures the vital port of Buchanan, the major import/ export channel, from Charles Taylor, alongside other important territories such as Harbel and Kakata.
17 July 1993	Ostensibly abandoned by its friends – Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire – and under intense military pressure, war-weary NPFL requests that the UN envoy convene another round of peace talks in Geneva. So, under the tripartite auspices of the UN, OAU and ECOWAS, the NPFL, IGNU and ULIMO agree to a new agreement which provides for a transitional government, general and presidential elections after six months. None of the leaders of the factions may participate in the transitional government, although they may contest in the elections which follow.
25 July 1993	Geneva II is ratified at the Cotonou ECOWAS Summit. This agreement provides for a Joint Cease-fire Monitoring Committee (JCMC) made up of representatives from ECOMOG, the three Liberian factions (NPFL, INPFL and ULIMO) as well as members of the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). The JCMC will later be replaced by a new monitoring team composed of fresh ECOMOG troops and an African contingent to be drawn from Botswana, Egypt, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
22 September 1993	The UN Security Council passes Resolution 866 establishing the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), charged with the responsibility of monitoring the implementation of the Geneva II(Cotonou) peace plan and cease-fire and the UN-imposed arms embargo. The mission was also to coordinate ECOMOG’s non-enforcement activities.
November 1993	Dr. Amos Sawyer, head of IGNU, declares ECOMOG “a West African success story,” despite renewed fears that the Cotonou Accord may be endangered by NPFL’s sudden replacement of the “more congenial” Dorothy Museleng-Cooper with “Battlefield Commander” Isaac Musa in the Transitional Council of State.
January 1994	The Cotonou Accord runs into a deadlock over the sequence and timetable for implementing three aspects of the Accord: disarmament, installation of the transitional government, and presidential elections. NPFL wants the installation of the transitional government to be followed by general elections before disarmament, whereas IGNU and ULIMO insist that the disarmament provision must first be implemented before any other provisions.
7 February 1994	The Cotonou Accord is amended and supplemented by the “Triple 7 Agreement.” Negotiated with the help of ECOWAS and the US Ambassador to Liberia, Triple 7 responds to the problem of sequencing in Cotonou Accord by requiring that the deployment of peacekeeping troops, disarmament, and the installation of LNTG all commence simultaneously on March 7, 1994.
7 March 1994	LNTG installed per the Cotonou agreement with Mr David Kpomakphor as Chairman.

Late March 1994	Renewed fighting breaks out resulting from the split of ULIMO into ULIMOs M and K.
12 September 1994	Akosombo Accord Signed. Peace returns to Liberia.
17 September 1994	Elements of AFL attempted overthrowing the Transitional Government, leading to renewed fighting again between AFL and the other factions.
21 December 1994	Accra Accord signed by factions calling for a cease fire effective 28 December 1994.
March 1996	Peace again disrupted with fighting, when attempts were made to oust Roosevelt Johnson of ULIMO K from the transitional government.
August 1996	Abuja Accord signed to end fighting. All factions were to be disarmed and be considered dissolved by 31 January 1997.

Source : Adapted from Clement Adibe, Managing Arms in Peace Process : Liberia (New York: United Nations Publications, 1996), 51-55.

APPENDIX D

EARLY WARNING INDICATORS

The following indicators are cited as particularly relevant to the identification of states that may be in danger of collapse.

1. Demographic pressure: rapid changes in population, including massive refugee movement, high population density, youth bulge, insufficient food or access to safe water, ethnic groups sharing land.
2. Unwillingness to resettle own citizens (refugees) in country.
3. Undemocratic practices and human rights abuses.
4. Regimes of short duration.
5. Ethnic composition of the ruling elite differing from the population at large.
6. Deterioration or elimination of public services.
7. Sharp and severe economic distress; uneven economic development along ethnic line and lack of trade openness.
8. Massive, chronic or sustained human flight.

Nearly every country in Africa might have at least one of the above characteristics. A critical mass of these symptoms in one country could therefore very well serve as a credible warning signal of developing problems.

Source: Daniel C. Esty, Lack A Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Pamela T. Surko, and Alan N. Unger, Working Papers: State Failure Task Force Report, November 30, 1995; Pauline H. Baker and John A. Ansink, "State Collapse and Ethnic Violence: Toward a Predictive Model," Parameters 25, No. 1 (Spring 1996), 19-36.

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


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
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